

J. Milton

THE
Secrets of Government,
AND
Misteries of State,
Plainly laid open, in all the several
Forms of Government
IN THE
CHRISTIAN WORLD.

By J. Milton

Published by
JOHN MILTON, Esq;

Printed in the Year, 1697.

TO THE
READER.

HAVING had the *Manuscript* of this *Treatise*, Written by Sir *Walter Raleigh*, many Years in my Hands, and finding it lately by chance among other Books and Papers, upon reading thereof, I thought it a kind of Injury to withhold longer the Work of so Eminent an Author from the Publick; it being both answerable in

To the Reader.

Stile to other Works of his
already Extant, as far as the
Subject would permit, and
given me for a true Copy
by a Learned Man at his
Death, who had Collected
several such Pieces.

John Milton.

T H E

T H E
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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Excellent Woman described by her True Characters, and their Opposites.
Printed for *J. Watts*.

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The Secrets of Government,

A N D

Mysteries of State,

Plainly laid open.

C H A P. I.

*The Definition and Division of
Publick Weales and Sovereign
States, according to their seve-
ral Species or Kinds.*

her
ites.

A Common-wealth is a certain So-
vereign Government of many
Families, with those things that
are common among them.

E

All Common-wealths }
are either } *Monarchies,*
 } *Aristocracies, or*
 } *Democracies.*

B

A

2 *The Secrets of Government.*

A *Monarchy* is that State where the Sovereignty resteth in the Person of one only Prince.

An *Aristocracy*, is where some small part of the People have in them as a Body corporate, the Sovereignty and Supreme Power of the whole State.

A *Democracy*, is where all the People have Power and Authority Sovereign.

So doth it appear, that the Place and Person where the Sovereignty resteth, doth cause the State to be either a *Monarchy*, an *Aristocracy*, or *Popular Government*.

C H A P. II.

Of Sovereign or Monarchick Government, with its Essential Marks, and Specifical Differences.

Sovereignty is an absolute and perpetual Power in every publick State, and he is properly and only a Sovereign, that acknowledgeth no Superior or Equal, nor holdeth of any other Prince, Person or Power, but God and his own Sword.

The first Mark of Sovereignty, is absolute Power and Authority to command all Subjects in general, and every of them in particular, without consent of any other Person or Persons, either greater or inferior to himself.

The second Mark of Majesty is Authority to make War, and conclude Peace at his pleasure.

The third is Power to bestow all Honors and chief Offices at his pleasure.

The Fourth Mark of Sovereignty is Appellation.

The Fifth Mark and last, is power to pardon all Subjects by rigor of Law or otherwise, condemned in Life, Lands, Goods or Honors.

These Powers are not to be imparted to any Officer, Deputy or other Magistrate, but in the Prince's absence, and for some urgent occasion.

Monarchies are of three
 forts, $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Signioril}, \\ \textit{Royal} \text{ and} \\ \textit{Tyrannical}. \end{array} \right.$

The Diversity of Monarchies doth not proceed from the Nature of the State, but the diverse proceedings of those Princes that govern; for great difference there may be between the nature of the Commonwealth and the Government thereof. That Prince that giveth the Magistracies Honors and Offices without respect of Nobility, Riches or Vertue, may be said to govern popularly. And that Monarchy may be said to be governed Aristocratically, when the Monarch imparteth the principal Honors and Offices to the Noble and Rich Men only.

The

The same difference there is to be found in States Aristocratical and Popular; for the one and the other may be both Signioril or Tyrannical.

A Monarch Signioril is he who by force of Arms and just War, is made Owner of Mens Bodies and Goods, and governeth them as a Master of a Family governeth base Servants and Slaves.

A Monarch Royal, is he whose Subjects are obedient unto his Laws, and the Monarch himself obeyeth the Laws of God and Nature, suffering every Subject to enjoy Liberty natural, with Property in Lands and Goods, governing as a Father governeth his Children.

A Monarch Tyrannical, is he who without regard to the Law of God or Nature, commandeth Free-men as Slaves and useth their Lands and Goods as his own.

C H A P. III.

Of Monarchy Signioril, Exemplified in the Turkish and West-Indian Empire.

ALL People subject to Princes, are governed as Free-men by their Prince, and certain other particular Lords of Lands and Liberties; who not by the Princes Commission, but by Ancient Laws or Custom, have Inheritance and Tenements; or else they are by one Prince and his Ministers commanded, which Ministers have not by Law or Ordinance, any Authority or Interest of themselves, but being like to the People (base Men and Slaves) they command only by Commission in the Princes name; and the Authority of those Ministers doth cease at the Princes pleasure, so that the People do not acknowledge any Superior but the Prince, nor owe any Service to other mean Lords :

Lords : So as all the People stand without Property in Lands or Goods ; for example, the Empire of *Turky* and the *West-Indies*.

The Provinces of this Monarchy are allotted to sundry Magistrates or Ministers, and they altered and removed at the Princes pleasure ; but it is otherwise in a Monarchy Royal, because the Monarch is there accompanied with many mean Lords. And albeit those mean Lords are Subjects unto the Prince, yet have they particular Tenants, who may not, without just cause, be dispossessed by the Prince ; and those People having had dependency of their Lords and their Ancestors, do ever beare unto them a certain natural Love and dutiful Respect ; whoso therefore compareth these Principalities, shall perceive, that to Conquer a State Signioril there is great difficulty, but being conquered, it may easily be maintained ; for the difficulty to conquer such a State, proceedeth from the lack of mean Lords to call in and assist the Prince that doth invade : Who therefore desireth to subdue

a Nation thus governed, must of force assault all the People, and rather trust in his own Strength than the Aid of the Country. But if he can prevail, then one only Fear remaineth, which is the Prince's Posterity, which necessarily must be extinguished, because the Prince's Race only hath Interest both in the People and Soldiers. But to enter a Monarchy Royal, is an Enterprize of no great Difficulty, when he that doth enter, hath the Friendship and Aid of some mean Lords to take his part, and prepare the place where he is to arrive.

C H A P. IV.

*Of Monarchies Royal, with the Means
to maintain them.*

Monarchies Royal are for the most part Ancient and Hereditary, and consequently easie to be governed. For it is sufficient for the Prince to maintain the old Laws, and on occasion
tem-

temporize with those Accidents that happen : Such a State cannot be taken from the Prince without excessive Force, and if it be, it shall be soon recovered. Example, *England and France.*

But if a Monarchy newly conquered, be annexed unto an old, and not properly Ancient, then it is with much more difficulty maintained.

First, For that Men naturally inclined to Variation, are easily induced to take Arms against him that newly governeth.

Secondly, Every new Prince is forced to exact as well upon those Subjects that joyned with him, as those that did resist him, and therefore shall offend both. Example, *Ireland annexed to the Crown of England, Sicilia and Naples to Spain.*

The means to maintain such a Monarchy, is,

First, To extinguish the Race of him that was anciently Prince.

Secondly, To continue all Laws and Customs in the former Force; for so shall the Subject find nothing altered but the Prince, and therefore will soon rest contented; and the rather if that new Monarchy,

Monarchy, and the ancient Dominion of the Prince, be of one Language: But if the People be of a contrary Language and Humor, then to hold it, there needeth great Industry and Fortune; in that case the best way is, that the Prince should inhabit there, as well to incounter all Inconveniences proceeding from the Subject, as to preserve the People from Oppression of his own Ministers. Another way is, to send thither certain Colonies, and plant them in fit places, or else to settle some Garisons both of Horse and Foot; but Colonies are less chargeable to the Prince. As for the People inhabitant (who must necessarily remove, they being a small number and dispossessed) they cannot have power to offend; for in that case, this Rule or Maxim shall be found true, that Men must be either kindly intreated, or with all Extremity oppressed; because of light Injuries they may be revenged, but of utter Oppression they cannot.

A third way to hold a conquered Dominion, is, to cherish and defend the Neighbors of little Power, and oppress or keep under those that are most Potent;

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Potent; and above all, to take order that no Forreign Prince or Power do enter; for it is ever to be looked for, that so many of the Nation as are discontented, either for Ambition or Fear, will be ever ready to bring in Strangers: And to conclude this matter of Principality annexed, I say it behoveth every Prince possessed of such a State, never to increase the Power of any Potent Neighbor, never to oppress those that are of small Power, never to permit any Forreign Potentate to enter, but ever to plant Colonies and Garisons, or else to make that Dominion his chief Habitation.

C H A P. V.

Of Monarchies Tyrannical.

TYRANNICAL Princes are not advanced by Favor, neither do they trust unto Fortune, but by degrees of War, or else by some other indirect means do aspire unto Greatness; and therein do
maintain

maintain themselves by all ways either Honest or Dishonest, without respect of Justice, Conscience or Law either of Nations or Nature : A Prince by such impious means aspired, and desiring to hold that he hath gained, will take order that the Cruelties he committeth may be done roundly, suddenly, and as it were at an instant ; for if they be executed at leisure and by piece-meal, then will the Prince's Fears continue long, and the Terror in Subjects take deeper Impression, whose Nature is such, that either they must be bound by Benefits, or by Cruelty made sure from offending : Example, *Dionysius* and *Agathocles*.

C H A P. VI.

Of new found Monarchies and Principalities, with the means to perpetuate them.

SOME other Princes there are, that from private Estate have aspired to Sovereignty, not by unnatural or impious proceedings as the former, but by Vertue and Fortune, and being aspired, have found

found no great Difficulty to be maintained; for such a Prince having no other Dominion, is forced to settle himself where he is become a Prince: But here is to be noted, that albeit such a Man be Vertuous, yet wanting Fortune, his Vertue proveth to small purpose, and Fortune without Vertue doth seldom work any great Effect. Howsoever it be, a Prince being aspired, both by the Aid of the one and of the other, shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten; because he is forced to introduce new Laws and new Orders of Government differing from the old, as well for his own Security, as confirmation of the Government; for avoiding of which Dangers, he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compel his Subjects to obey, or must pray in aid of others: If he can do the first, he needeth not doubt, but being driven to the other, his Greatness cannot long continue; for albeit a matter of no difficulty, it is to perswade a People; yet to make them constant, is a work well near impossible. Example, *Theseus, Cyrus, Romulus.*

The

The second sort of new Princes are such as be aspired by Favor or Corruption, or by the Vertue or Greatness of Fortune or Friends: A Prince by any or all these means advanced, and desirous to hold his Estate, must endeavor by his own Vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other; which may be done by this means: First, To assure all Enemies from offending. Secondly, To win the Love and Friendship of so many Neighbors as possibly he may. Thirdly, To compass all Designs tending to his Honor or Profit, and bring them to pass either by Fraud or Force. Fourthly, To make himself honored and followed of Captains and Soldiers. Fifthly, To oppress all those that would or can offend. Sixthly, To be obsequious and liberal to Friends, magnanimous and terrible to Foes. Seventhly, To cast all old and unfaithful Bands, and entertain new. Eighthly, To hold such Amity with Kings and Princes, as they ought reasonably to favor him, or else they would offend; easily they cannot. Example, *Giovannio, Torrigiani, Caesar, Borgia.*

The

The third and last means whereby private Persons do aspire to Principalities, is not Force and Violence, but meer good Will and Favor of Men. The cause or occasion thereof, is only Vertue or Fortune, or at least a certain Fortunate Craft and Wittiness, because he aspireth either by Favor of the People, or by Favor of the Nobility; for these contrary Humors are in all Commonwealths to be found. And the reason thereof is, that the great Men do ever endeavor to oppress the People, and the People do labor not to be oppressed by them. Of these divers Appetites one of these three Effects do proceed, *viz.* Principality, Liberty, or Licentious Life. Principality may come either by love of the Multitude, or of the great Men; for when any of these Factions do find it self oppressed, then do they soon consent to make one a Prince, hoping by his Vertue and Valor to be defended. Example, *Francesco Sforza, Alessandro de Medici.*

A Prince in this sort aspired, to maintain his Estate, must first consider well by which of these Factions aforesaid he
is

is advanced; for if by Favor of great Men he be aspired, then must he meet with many Difficulties; for having about him divers Persons of great Quality, and such as were but lately his Equals, hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth: But if the Prince be advanced by the People, few or none shall hardly disobey him. So it appeareth that a Prince made by the Multitude, is much more secure than he whom the Nobility preferreth; for common People do not desire to enjoy more than their own, and to be defended from Oppression; but great Men do study not only to hold their own, but also to command and insult upon Inferiors.

Note that all Monarchies are Principalities.

But all Principalities are not Monarchies.

CHAP. VII.

*Of Councils, and Counsellors in
general.*

A Senate or Council is a certain lawful Assembly of Counsellors, to give advice to him or them that have in the Commonweale Power Sovereign.

A Counsellor is called in the Latine *Senator*; which Word signifieth in effect an old Man: The *Grecians* and *Romans* also most commonly composed their Councils of ancient and expert Persons; for if they, or the greater part of them had been Young Men, then might the Council have more properly been called a *Juvenate* than a *Senate*.

The chief and most necessary Note required in a Counsellor is to have no dependence of any other Prince or Commonweale; either Oath, Homage, Natural Obligation, Pension, or Reward: In this Point the *Venetians* have been ever most precise, and for that reason, do not admit any Cardinal or other
C Clergy

Clergy-man to be either of or at their Councils, therefore when the *Venetian* Senate is Assembled, the Usher being ready to shut the Door, cryeth aloud, *Fuora Preti, Depart Priest.* Note also that in every State, of what Quality soever, a Secret or Cabinet-Council is mainly necessary.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Councils in some particular Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Democracies.

THE King of *Spain*, for the Government of his Dominions hath Seven Councils, (*viz.*) the Council of the *Indies*, the Council of *Spain*, the Council of *Italy* and the Low Countries, the Council of War, the Council of Orders, the Council of Inquisition, and the Council Royal.

In *France* are Three Councils, (*viz.*) the Council Privy, the Council of Judges, which they call *Presidents et Concelliers*

res

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ers de Parlement, and the great Council, which they call *Assemblies du troys Estates*.

Of Councils in Aristocracies.

In *Venice*, beside the Senate and great Council, are Four Councils, (*viz.*) the Sages of the Sea, the Sages of the Land, the Council of Tenn, the Three Presidents of *Quarantia*, and the Senate: All which Councils do amount to One hundred and twenty Persons, with the Magistrates.

The Great Council of *Ragusa* consisteth of Sixty Persons, and hath another Privy Council of Twelve.

Of Councils in Democracies.

Genova hath Three Councils: the Great Council of Two hundred, the Senate which consisteth of Sixty, and the Privy Council which hath Twenty six Counsellors: So it doth appear that in all Commonwealths, be they Monarchies, Aristocracies, or Popular States. The Council-Privy is most necessary,
C 2 and

and often used ; Also this difference is to be noted between the Councils in Monarchies, and the Councils in *Aristocracies* and States Popular ; that is to say, that all Deliberations fit to be published, are in a Monarchy consulted and resolved upon in the Council Privy, and after ratified by Common Council ; But in Optimacies or Popular Government the Custom is contrary.

Here also is to be noted, that albeit the Use and Authority of every Senate a Privy Council is most needful, yet hath it no Authority to command but in the name of those in whom the Sovereignty resteth : For if Counsellors had power to command absolutely, then should they be Sovereigns, and consequently all Execution at their Pleasure ; which may not be without detracting from Majesty, which is a thing so Sovereign and Sacred, as no Citizen or Subject of what quality soever, may touch or approach thereunto.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

*Of Officers and Commissioners with
their respective Distinctions.*

AN Officer is a Person publick, that hath Charge ordinary and limited by Law.

A Commissioner is also a Person publick, but his Charge is extraordinary and limited by Commission.

Officers are of two sorts, and so be Commissioners; the one hath power to command, and are called Magistrates: the other hath Authority to execute: so the one and the other are Persons publick: yet are not all publick Persons either Officers or Commissioners.

Commissioners are ordained to govern in Provinces, in War, in Justice, in disposing the Treasure, or some other Function concerning the State; but all Commissions do spring and proceed from the Sovereign, Magistrates and Commissioners. And here is to be noted, that every Commission ceas-

eth if he that granted the Commission doth dye, or revoke it, or if the Commissioners during his Commission shall aspire to Office and Authority equal to his that made it.

CHAP. X.

Of Magistrates, their Qualifications and Elections.

A Magistrate is an Officer having power to Command in the State ; and albeit that every Magistrate be an Officer, yet every Officer is not a Magistrate, but they only that have power to command.

Also in making Officers of and Magistrates in every Commonweale , Three things are specially to be observed (*viz.*) who doth make them, what Men they are that should be made, and the form and manner how they are made.

The

The first appertaineth to him or them in whom the Sovereignty resteth; the second also belongeth to Majesty; yet therein the Laws are commonly followed, especially in *Aristocracies* and States Popular; In the one the Magistrates are chosen out of the most Wealthy or most Noble: In the other, elected out of the whole Multitude.

The form and manner of choosing Magistrates in *Aristocracies* and States Popular, is either by Election, by Lot, or by both, and their Office is to compel those that do not Obey what Sovereignty commandeth: For all force of Commandment lieth in Compulsion.

Commandment likewise is of two sorts; the one may be called Sovereign and Absolute, above Laws, above Magistrates, and above People. In Monarchies such Command is proper to the Prince only; in *Aristocracies* it resteth in the Nobility: And in *Democracies* the People have that power.

The second Commandments are Subject both to Sovereignty and Law.

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Here is to be noted, that every Magistrate may recall his own Commandment, and forbid what he did Command, yet cannot revoke that which he hath Judged.

* Commissions determine in presence of him that granted them.

* Also in the presence of the Sovereign, all Authority of Magistrates ceaseth; and in presence of great Magistrates the inferior have no power; and Magistrates equal cannot do any thing but by Consent, if his Colleagues or Fellow-Magistrates be present.

C H A P. XI.

Observations intrinsically concerning every Publick State in points of Justice, Treasure and War.

THE First concern matter Intrinsick.

The Second touch matter Extrinsic.

Matters

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Matters Intrinsick are Three.

The Administration of Justice.

The Managing of the Treasure.

The disposing of things appertaining
to War.

Matters Extrinsick are also Three.

The Skill how to deal with Neighbors.

The Diligence to vent their Designs.

The way how to win so much Confidence with some of them, as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprize.

Touching Administration of Justice.

The good and direct Administration of Justice, is in all Places a principal part of Government; for seldom or never shall we see any People discontented and desirous of Alteration, where Justice is equally administred without respect of Persons; and in every State this Consideration is required, but most of all in Countries that do front upon other Princes, or were lately conquered:

Here

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Hereunto the Princes Vigilancy and the Magistrates Uprightness are especially required; for oftentimes the Prince is deceived, and the Magistrates corrupted; it behoveth also the Prince to maintain the Judges and Ministers of Justice in their Reputation, and yet to have a vigilant Eye upon their Proceedings, and the rather if their Authority do include Equity, and from their Censure be no Appeal; and if their Office be during Life, and they are Men born and dwelling in the same Country; all these things are duly to be considered of the Prince; for as to call the Judges into question, is as it were to disgrace the Judicial Seat; so to wink at their Corruptions were matter of just discontent to the Subject: in this case therefore the Prince cannot do more than by his Wisdom to make choice of Good Men; and being chosen, to hold them in good Reputation so as the ordinary course of Justice may proceed; for otherwise great Disorder, Contempt, and general Confusion will ensue thereof. Secondly, he is to keep his Eye open upon their Proceedings; and lastly

ly to reserve unto himself a Supreme Power of Appellation.

Touching the Treasure.

The want of Money is in all States very perilous, and most of all in those which are of least Strength, and do confine upon Nations with whom they have commonly War, or unassured Peace, but most perilous of all to those Governments which are remote from the Prince, or Place where they are to be relieved.

The means to Levy Treasure are Four.

First, The Customs and Impositions upon all sorts of Merchandize and Traffick is to be looked unto and advanced.

Secondly, The excessive eating of Usury must be suppressed.

Thirdly, All superfluous Charges and Expences are to be taken away.

Lastly, The doings and accounts of Ministers are severally to be examined.

Touching the matter of Custom and Impost thereof, assuredly a great Profit is in every State to be raised ;
chiefly

chiefly where Peace hath long continued, and where the Country affordeth much plenty of Commodities to be carried out, and where Ports are to receive Shipping.

The moderating of Interest is ever necessary, and chiefly in this Age, by reason that Money aboundeth in *Europe*; since the Traffick into the *Indies*; for such Men as have Money in their Hands great plenty, would in no wise imploy the same in Merchandize, if lawful it were to receive the utmost Usury, being a Course of most Profit and greatest Security.

The taking away of superfluous Expences is no other thing than a certain wise and laudable Parsimony; which the *Romans* and other well governed States did use. These Expences consist in Fees, Allowances, and Wages granted to Ministers of little or no Necessity; also in Pensions, Rewards, Entertainments and Donaries, with small Difficulty to be moderated, or easily to be suppressed.

* By.

* By abridging or taking away of these needless Expences a marvelous Profit will be saved for the Prince; but if he continue them, and by imposing upon the People do think to increase his Treasure or Revenue, besides the loss of their Love, he may also hazard their Obedience, with many other Inconveniences.

* So *Henry the Fourth of France* by putting his Courtiers to Board-wages was said to make Money with his Teeth.

Touching War.

Whatsoever Prince or Commonwealth is Neighbour to any People which can, will, or were wont to offend, it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his Person and Country, but also to forecast and use every caution and other diligence: For the Inconveniencies which happen to Government, are sudden and unlook'd for; yea, the Providence and Provision required in this Case ought to be such as the Expences

pences all other ways employed must stay to supply the Necessity of War.

CHAP XII.

Extrinsick Observation, shewing how to deal with Neighbor Princes and Provinces respectively, how to prevent their Designs, and decipher their Intendments.

THIS first Point of matter Extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good, but otherwise becometh dangerous; for the Proceeding must be divers according to the diversity of the Ends which the Prince or Governor intendeth; for if he desire to continue Peace with his Neighbors, one way is to be taken; but otherwise he is to work that seeketh occasion to break, and to become an Enemy to one or more of his Neighbors. If he do desire to live peaceably withal, then he is to observe these Rules (*viz.*)

First,

First, To hold and continue firmly all Contracts and Capitulations.

Secondly, To shew himself resolved neither to offer nor take the least touch of Wrong or Injury.

Thirdly, With all care and favor to further Commerce and reciproke Traffick for the profit of the Subject, and increase of the Princes Revenue.

Fourthly, Covertly to win so great Confidence with Neighbors, as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made Umpire.

Fifthly, To become so well believed with them as he may remove such Diffidences as grow to his own disadvantage.

Sixthly, Not to deny Protection or Aid to them that are the weakest, and chiefly such as do and will endure his Fortune.

Lastly, In Favouring, Aiding and Protecting (unless necessity shall otherwise so require) to do it moderately, so as they who are to be aided, become not Jealous, and consequently seek Adherency elsewhere, which oft-times hath opened way to other Neighbors that desire a like occasion.

How

How to prevent their Designs.

This Point in time of War is with great diligence to be looked unto; also in time of Peace to prevent all occasions that may kindle War is behoveful; for to foresee what may happen to the Prejudice of a Princes Profit or Reputation, is a part of great Wisdom. The means to attain the Intelligence of these things are two.

The First is by Friends, the next by Espials; the one for the most part faithful, the other not so assured.

These matters are well to be considered; for albeit the Nature of Man desireth nothing more than curiously to know the doings of others, yet are those things to be handled with so great Secrecy and Dissimulation as the Princes Intent be not in any wise suspected, nor the Ministers made odious; for these sometimes to win themselves Reputation, do devise causes of Difference where no need is, divining of things Future which prove to the Prejudice of their own Prince.

To win Confidence with Neighbors.

This is chiefly attained unto by being Loved and Honored ; for these things do work so many good Effects, as daily Experience sufficeth without any express Example to prove them of great Force.

The ways to win Love and Trust, is in all Actions to proceed Justly, and sometimes to wink at Wrongs, or set aside unnecessary Revenges ; and if any thing be done not justifiable, or unfit to be allowed, as oftentimes it happeneth, there to lay the Blame upon the Minister, which must be performed with so great show of Revenge and Dissimulation, by reproving and punishing the Minister, as the Princes offended may be satisfied, and believe that the cause of Unkindness proceeded from thence.

Now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching Provision, to the end the People may not be drawn into despair by Famine, or extream Dearth of Victual, and chiefly for want

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of Corn, which is one principal Consideration to be regarded, according to the Italian Proverb, *Pane in Piazza, Giustizia in Palazzo, sverezza per tutto*: Whereunto I could wish every Prince or Supreme Governor to be thus qualified (*viz.*) *Facile de audienza: non facile de credenza, desioso de spedition, esemplare in costunii proprii, & in quei de sua casa tale che vorrà governare, e non esser governato da altro; he della ragione.*

CHAP.

C H A P. XIII.

*Observations confirmed by Authorities
of Princes and Principalities,
Charaſtering an excellent Prince
or Governor.*

EVERY good and lawful Principality is either Elective or Succeſſive: Of them Election ſeemeth the more Ancient; but Succeſſion in divers reſpects the better: *Minore diſcrimine ſumitur Princeps quam quaeritur.* Tac.

The chief and only Endeavor of every good Prince, ought to be the Commodity and Security of the Subjects, as contrariwiſe the Tyrant ſeeketh his own private Profit with the Oppreſſion of his People: *Civium non ſervitus ſed tutela tradita eſt.* Sal.

To the Perfection of every good Prince, two things are neceſſarily required (*viz.*) Prudence and Vertue;

the one to direct his Doings, the other to govern his Life: *Rex eris si recte feceris.* Hor.

The second care which appertaineth to a good Prince, is to make his Subjects like unto himself; for thereby he is not only honored, but they also the better governed: *Facile imperium in bonos.* Plaut.

Subjects are made good by two means (*viz.*) by constraint of Law, and the Princes Example; for in all Estates, the People do imitate those Conditions whereunto they see the Prince enclined: *Quicquid faciunt principes, precipere videntur.* Quintil.

All Vertues be required in a Prince, but Justice and Clemency are most necessary; for Justice is a Habit of doing things Justly, as well to himself as others, and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth: This is that Vertue that preserveth Concord among Men, and whereof they be called good: *Ius & equitas vincula civitatum.* Cic.

* It is the Quality of this Vertue also, to proceed equally and temperately; it informeth the Prince not to surcharge the Subjects with infinite Laws; for thereof proceedeth the Impoverishment of the Subjects and the Inriching of Lawyers, a kind of Men which in Ages more Ancient, did seem of no Necessity: *Sine caufidicis satis faelices olim fuere futuraque sunt urbes.* Sal.

*The Author of the Epistle Dedicatory to the Dutches of Suffolk, prefix'd to Mr. Latimer's Sermons, saith, that Lawyers covetousness hath almost devoured England.

The next Vertue required in Princes is Clemency, being an Inclination of the Mind to Lenity and Compassion, yet tempered with Severity and Judgment; this Quality is fit for all great Personages, but chiefly Princes, because their occasion to use it is most; by it also the Love of Men is gained: *Qui vult regnare, languida regnet manu.* Sen.

After Clemency, Fidelity is expected in all good Princes, which is a certain Performance and Observation of Word and Promise; this Vertue seemeth to

accompany Justice, or is as it were the same, and therefore most fit for Princes: *Sanctissimum generis humani bonum.* Liv.

As Fidelity followeth Justice, so doth Modesty accompany Clemency; Modesty is a Temperature of Reason, whereby the Mind of Man is so governed, as neither in Action or Opinion he over-deemeth of himself, or any thing that is his; a Quality not common in Fortunate Folk, and most rare in Princes: *Superbia commune nobilitatis malum.* Sal.

This Vertue doth also moderate all External Demonstration of Insolence, Pride and Arrogance, and therefore necessary to be known of Princes, and all others whom Favor or Fortune have advanced: *Impone felicitati tuae frenos, facilius illam reges.* Curt.

But as Princes are to observe the Bounds of Modesty, so may they not forget the Majesty appertaining to their Supreme Honor, being a certain Reverend Greatness due to Princely Vertue and Royal State; a Grace and Gravity no less befitting a Prince than Vertue
it

it self; for neither over-much Familiarity, nor too great Austerity, ought to be used by Princes: *Facilitas auctoritatem, severitas amorem minuit.* Tac.

To these Vertues we may apply Liberality, which doth not only Adorn, but highly Advance the Honor due to Princes; thereby also the good Will of Men is gained; for nothing is more fitting a Prince's Nature than Bounty, the same being accompanied with Judgment, and performed according to the Laws of Liberality: *Perdere multi sciunt, donare nesciunt.* Tac.

It seemeth also that Prudence is not only fit, but also, among other Vertues, necessary in a Prince; for the daily use thereof is in all Humane Actions required, and chiefly in Matters of State and Government: *Prudentia imperantis propria & unica virtus.* Arist.

The Success of all Worldly Proceedings, doth shew that Prudence hath compassed the Prosperous Event of Humane Actions, more than Force of Arms or other Power: *Mens una sapiens plurimum vincit manus.* Eurip.

Prudence is either natural, or received from others; for whoſo can Counſel himſelf what is fit to be done, needeth not the Advice of others; but they that want ſuch Perfection, and are nevertheleſs capable, and are willing to know what others inform, ought to be accounted wiſe enough:

Laudatiſſimus eſt qui cuncta videbit, ſed laudandus eſt is qui paret recte monenti.
Hefiod.

C H A P. XIV.

*Of the Princes intimate Counsellors
and Ministers of State, with their
several Requisites.*

ALbeit the excellent Spirit of some Princes be such as doth justly deserve the highest Commendation; yet for that every Course of Life needeth the Aid of Men, and the Mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite Care appertaining to publick Affairs; it becometh Princes to be assisted: *Magna negotia, adjutoribus egent.* Tac.

The Assistants may be properly divided into Counsellors and Ministers; the one to Advise, the other to Execute: Without Counsel, no Kingdom, no State, no private House can stand; for Experience hath proved, that Common-weales have prospered so long as good Counsel did govern, but when Favor, Fear or Voluptuousness entered,
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those Nations became disordered; and in the end subject to Slavery: *Quidam sacrum profecto est Consultatio.* Plato.

Counsellors are Men specially selected to give Advice to Princes or Commonwealths, as well in Peace as in War; the chief Qualities required in such Men, are Fidelity and Knowledge; which two concurring do make them both Good and Wise, and consequently fit for Counsel: *Prudentis proprium munus recte consulere.* Arist.

The Election of Counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among Men of long Experience and grave Years; for as Youth is fittest for Action in respect of Corporal Strength; so elder Folk having felt the Force of every Fortune, and observed the Course of Worldly Proceedings do seem most meet for Consultation: *Consilia senum, facta juvenum.* Plato.

Albeit we say that the Excellency of Wisdom should be in Counsellors; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a Conceit as is more apt for Innovation than orderly Government: *Hebetiores*

quas

quam acutiores melius Remp. administrant.
Thucyd.

To Fidelity and Experience we wish that our Counsellors should be endued with Piety, Liberty, Constancy, Modesty and Silence; for as the Aid and Assistance of God is that which governeth all good Counsels, so liberty of Speech, and magnanimous uttering of what is good and fit, is necessary in Counsellors. Likewise to be constant and not to vary in opinion, either for Fear or Favor, is very commendable: Also as Modesty in giving Counsel escheweth all Offences, and gaineth good Will, so Secresie is the best and most secure means to govern all publick Affairs: *Res magnæ sustineri non possunt ab eo qui tacere nequit.* Curt.

The first Obstacle to good Counsel is Pertinacy or Opiniativeness; a Condition far unfit for Counsellors; yet some Men are so far in love with their own Opiniastre Conceits, as that they cannot patiently endure Opposition. Secondly, Discord must from Counsellors be removed, because private Offence many times impeacheth publick Proceedings. Thirdly,

Thirdly, Affection is an Enemy to Counsel, the same being commonly accompanied with Anger, wherewith nothing can be rightly or considerately done. Lastly, Avarice seemeth a Vice worthy to be abhorred of all Counsellors, because it driveth away both Fidelity and Honesty, the principal Pillars of all good Council: *Pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum, utilitas.* Tac.

To good Counsel other Impediments there are, which square not with Wisdom; for all Crafty and Hazarding Counsels do seem in the beginning likely to succeed; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil Event. It therefore seemeth behoveful to be wary in resolving, and bold in executing: *Animus vereri qui scit, scit tuto aggredi.* Pub.

Another Lett to good Consultation is immoderate Desire, which every wise Man must endeavor to restrain: *Cupiditate pauca recte sunt, circumspeditione plurima.* Thucyd.

Thirdly, Haste is an Enemy to good Deliberation; for who so greedily desireth any thing, proceedeth rashly; and
rash

rash proceeding endeth ever in Repentance: *Scelera impetu, bona consilia mora valescunt.* Tac.

Of Ministers of State.

Having already spoken of Counsellors, somewhat is to be spoken of Ministers; I mean those that either publicly or privately serve the Prince in any Function; in choice of which Men, care must be had; First, That they be Persons honestly born; for no Man descended of base Parentage may be admitted, unless in him be found some noble and excellent Vertue: *Optimus quisque Nobilissimus.* Plato.

Secondly, They ought to be of honest Condition, and of good Fame; for that Common-weale is better and more secure, where the Prince is not good, than is that where his Ministers are Evil. It seemeth therefore that Ministers should be Men of good Quality and Blameless: *Emitur sola virtute potestas.* Claud.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Consideration is to be had of their Capacity and Fitness, for that Function wherein they are to be used; for as some Men are apt for Learning, so others are naturally disposed to Arms. Also it is necessary that every one Square with the Office whereunto he is appointed, in which matter some Princes have used great Caution; for as they little liked of Men Excellent, so they utterly detested the Vitious; the one they doubted to trust in regard of themselves, the other were thought a publick Indignity to the State. Wise Men have therefore resolved, that those Wits which are neither over-haughty and singular, nor they which be base or dull, are fittest for Princes Secrets and Services; howsoever we may hereof say with *Tacitus*: *Nescio quomodo Aulica hac comitia affectus dirigit, & fato quodam ac sorte nascendi, ut cetera, ita principum inclinatio in hos, offensio in illos est.* Tac.

And because the Course and Quality of Mens Lives serving in Court, is of all other the most uncertain and dangerous, great Heed and Circumspection ought therein to be used; for whose serveth negli-

negligently, forgetting the dutiful Endeavors appertaining to the place, seemeth to take a way of no good speed:

Quanto quis obsequio promptior, tanto honoribus & opibus extollitur. Tac.

It shall also become such a Man to look well unto his own Profit, and behave himself rather Boldly than Bashfully: *Malus minister Regii imperii pudor.* Sen.

To be Modest, and closely to handle all Actions, is also a course well beseeming a Courtier; neither shall he do well to attribute any good Success to his own Vertue or Merit, but acknowledge all to proceed from the Prince's Bounty and Goodness, by which means Envy is eschewed, and the Prince not robbed of his Honor: *Hac est conditio Regum, casus tantum adversos hominibus tribuant, secundos virtuti suæ.* Prov. Emped.

And to conclude these Precepts Summarily, I say it behoveth all Ministers and Servants in Court to be Patient, Wary and of few words: *Fraudum sedes Aula.* Sen.

C H A P. XV.

The Art of Ruling, or Mystery of Regiment.

TO Govern, is a certain Skill how to command and continue Subjects in due Obedience, so as offend they ought not, or if they will they cannot; wherein two special things are to be considered (*viz.*) the Nature of Men, and the Nature of the State; but first the Condition of the Vulgar must be well conceived: *Noscenda natura vulgi, & quibus modis temperanter habeatur.* Tac.

The Disposition of Men is divers; some are apt to Anger, some are Hardy, some Fearful; it therefore behoveth the Prince to accommodate his Government to the Humor of People whom he governeth: *Principis est virtus maxima nosse suos.* Mart.

Likewise the Nature of Commonweals is mutable and subject to change, and Kings are not only accompanied with Fortune, but also followed with Hate, which breederh

breedeth a continual Diffidence, chiefly towards those that are nearest to Majesty : *Suspectus semper invisusque dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur.* Tac.

Moreover the Vulgar sort is generally variable, Rash, Hardy, and void of Judgment ; *Ex opinione multa, ex veritate pauca judicat.* Cic.

To confirm a Government, Force and Arms are of greatest necessity ; by force I mean the Guards and Arms which Princes use for their Defence or Ornament ; *Miles in foro, Miles in curia principem comitari debet.* Tac.

To this may be added Fortification and strong Buildings, in these days much used by new Princes, and others also to whom People yield, not willing Obedience. In ancient times Princes planted Colonies as well to suppress Rebellion in Conquered Countries, as to front suspected Neighbors : *Coloniae vera sedes servitutis.* Tac.

The Government of Princes is also greatly increased by a Virtue, which I call a commendable Affection in Subjects, proceeding of Love and Authority : These effects do grow from the
E Princes

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Princes own Merit, but their being liveth in the mind of the People; this Love is gained by Lenity, Liberality, and Mercy; yet is every of them to be tempered: *Nec aut reverentiam terrore, aut amorem humilitate captivis.* Plin.

• Affection is also no way sooner won then by Liberality, the same being used with Judgment and Moderation. *Bel-lorum sociis, periculorum consortibus, sivi de te bene ac fortiter — — — meritis.* Sen.

By Indulgence likewise, and Princely Affability, the love of Men is gain'd; for the Multitude desire no more than necessary Food and Liberty, to use ordinary Recreations: *Vulgo, sicut pueris, omne ludicrum in pretio est.* Sen.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Princely Authority; Wherein it consists, and how far to be extended and delegated.

A Uthority is a certain reverent Impression in the Minds of Subjects and others touching the Princes Virtue and Government; it resteth chiefly in Admiration and Fear: *Ingenita quibusdam gentibus erga reges suos veneratio.* Curt.

Authority consisteth in three things: (*viz.*) the Form of Government, the Strength of the Kingdom, and the Condition of the Prince; for in them all Reputation and Security resteth: *Majestas Imperii, salutis tutela.* Curt.

Whoſo deſireth to govern well, it be-
hoveth him to uſe Severity, Conſtancy
and Reſtraint; for over much Lenity
introduceth Contempt, and certain hope
of Impunity; the Condition of Men be-
ing ſuch as cannot be reſtrained by
Shame, yet it is to be commanded by

E 2

Fear:

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Tear : *Salutaris severitas vincit inanem speciem clementie.* Cic.

Yet ought Severity to be used with great respect and sparingly, because over great Terror breedeth Desperation : *Pana ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat.* Cic.

To govern constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and ancient Laws in force without Change or Innovation unless exceeding great Commodity or urgent Necessity shall so require : for where extream Punishments are used, Reformation is always needful : *Nocet interdum prisceus rigor & nimia severitas.* Tac.

Also to restrain Authority is a matter of great Necessity and worthy a Wise Prince ; else he maketh others partakers of the Honor and Power to himself only due, the same being also dangerous : *Periculosam privati hominis nomen supra (immo & juxta) principes extolli.* Tac.

It seemeth also perilous that great Authority given to private Men should be long ; for thereby oftentimes they are made Insolent and apt to Innovation : *Libertatis sive principatus magna custodia est ,*

est, si magna imperto diuturna esse non sinas. Liv.

Authority is also reinforced and enlarged by Power, without which no Prince can either take from others or defend his own: *Parum tutum sine viribus Majestas.* Liv.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Power and Force; and how to be raised and maintained.

Power and Strength is attained by these five ways, Money, Arms, Counsel, Friends and Fortune; but of these the first and most forcible is Money: *Nihil tam munitum quod non expugnari pecunia possit.* Cic.

Next to Money Arms are of most use as well to defend as to offend; to keep, and to conquer; for oftentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from others, as to hold what is our own: *Sua retinere privata est domus, de alienis certare Regia laus est.* Tac.

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Also of great and necessary use is Counsel, to devise how Arms ought to be employed or enforced : *Arma concilio temperanda.* Tac.

Likewise Friends and Confederates do greatly increase the Virtue of Power, the same being such as have both wit and ability to aid : *In caducum parietem ne inclina.* Adri.

The last, yet not the least part of Power consisteth in Fortune ; whereof daily Experience may be seen ; for the Success of all humane Actions seem rather to proceed from Fortune than Virtue : *Omni ratione potentior fortuna.* Curt.

To these Particularities concerning Power, we may add the Qualities of the Prince, which greatly Grace his Authority ; these are partly internal, and partly external : by the one I mean the Virtues of the Mind, by the other a certain seemly Behavior and comely gesture of the Body ; of the first kind I do suppose Piety and Providence to be the chief, for Piety maketh a Prince Venerable, and like unto God : *Oportet principem res divinas videre curare serio & ante omnia.* Arist.

Provi-

Providence is a Forecast and likely conjectures of things to come, supposed to be in those Princes that in their Actions proceed slowly and circumspectly, it seemeth also a course of Princely Discretion to be retired and not ordinarily to converse with many: *Autoritatem absentia tueare.* Suet.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Conspiracy and Treason, with the Causes and ways of Prevention or Discovery.

CONspiracy is commonly addressed to the Princes Person; Treasons are addressed against his Government, Authority, Country, Subjects, or Places of Strength. These Mischiefs are easily feared, but hardly eschewed; for albeit open Enemies are openly encountred, yet Fraud and Subtilty are secret Foes, and consequently not to be avoided:

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Occulta pericula neque praevidere neque vitare in promptu est. Salust.

The danger of Conspiracy proceedeth of divers Causes, as Avarice, Infidelity of Subjects, Ambition in Servants, and Corruption in Soldiers, therefore with great difficulty to be avoided: *Vita tuæ dominus est, quisquis suam contempsit.* Sen.

Notwithstanding it seemeth that either by Inquisition, Punishment, Innocency, or Destiny, the evil Affection of Men may be oftentimes discovered: 1. For whoſo will curiously inquire and conſider the Actions and ordinary Speeches of Men (I mean thoſe that be Perſons of Honor and Reputation) may oftentimes vent the Myne that lurketh in the Minds: *Quoniam rarò niſi male loquuntur mali faciunt.* Lipſ.

2. Punishment is likewise a thing ſo terrible that the Conſideration thereof with the hope of Reward doth often diſcover thoſe dangerous Intentions: *Cruciatu aut premio cuncta pervia ſunt.* Tac.

But as it is Wiſdom in Princes to give ear to Informers, ſo are they not always to be believed; for Hope, Envy, Hate,

Hate, or some other Passion oftentimes draws them to speak untruly : *Quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit?* Tac.

3. The third and likeliest Defence against Conspiracy is the Princes own Innocency ; for never having injured any Man, it cannot be thought there liveth any Subject so lewd as will endeavor to hurt him : *Fidelissima custodia principis ipsius innocentia.* Plin.

4. The last and best Bulward to withstand the force of this Mischief we call Destiny ; which proceeding from the Fountain of Divine Providence, may be truly called the Will of God ; in whose only Power it resteth to protect and defend good Princes : *Ille erit a latere tuo, & custodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris.* Salo.

Treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous Persons, who preferring private Profit before Fame or Fidelity, do not fear to enter into any impious Action : To this humor ambitious Men dissentious, and all such as be desirous of Innovation, are inclined : *Pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava struentes.* Hom.

To

To these Offenders no Punishment is equal to their impious Merit, can be devised, being Persons odious as well to Friends as Foes : *Proditores etiam in quos anteponunt, invisi sunt.* Tac.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Publick Hate and Contempt, with the Occasions and Means to redress and avoid it.

HAVING briefly touched the Virtues and Means whereby Princes are maintained in Authority and Honor, let something be said of the Causes from whence their Ruine doth proceed ; the chief whereof seemeth to be Hate and Contempt : Hate cometh of Fear, which the more Common it is, the more Dangerous : *Nulla vis imperii tanta est, quæ premente metu possit esse diuturna.* Cic.

The causes of Fear are Punishments, Impositions and Rigor ; and therefore
it

it behoveth a Prince not only to shun them, but to eschew those Actions whereby he may reasonable incur their Suspicion: *Sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint, non minus opinione & fama, quam certa aliqua ratione moveri.* Cic.

Yet Punishment, Imposition and Censure are in all States necessary, although they shew and seem terrible, and consequently breed a certain Desperation in Subjects, unless they be discreetly and modestly used; for extream and frequent Punishments taste of Cruelty; great and many Impositions favor of Covetousness; Censure of Manners when it exceedeth the quality of Offences, doth seem Rigour in these matters; therefore it behoveth the Prince to be moderate and cautelous, chiefly in Capital Punishment, which must be confined within the Bounds of Justice: *Sit apud principem parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis.* Sen.

But if for Security sake the Prince be forced to punish, let the same be done with shew of great Sorrow and Loathsomeness: *Tantum sceleris & mag-*

nocum tormento ad castigandum veniat.
Sen.

Let all Punishments also be slowly executed; for they that are hastily punished do seem to have been willingly condemned; neither ought any Capital Punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the Commonweale, and for Example sake: *Non tam ut ipsi pareant, quam ut alios pereundo deterreant.* Sen.

In punishing also a specil respect must be had, that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein: *Forma rabiet est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere.* Sen.

Also in Punishing, equality must be observed, and the nature of the Punishment according to the Custom: *Nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem.* Cic.

But in punishing publick Offences wherein a Multitude have part, the Execution ought to be otherwise, and as it were at an instant, which may haply seem terrible, but in effect is not: *Frequens vindicta paucorum odium reprimi; omnium terreat.* Sen.

Another

Another means to satisfy a People offended is to punish the Ministers of Cruelty, and with their Blood to wash away the common hatred. *Piculares publici odii victimæ.* Plin. By this King *David* did appease the *Gibeonites*.

The next cause of Discontent cometh of Impositions, under which word is comprehended all Levies of Money, a matter nothing pleasing to People, as that which they esteem equal to their own Lives: *Pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus.* Plaut.

First, to remove Hate conceived of this cause, there is nothing better then publick Expostulation of Necessity: for what Commonwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes? *Nulla quies gentium sine armis, nec arma sine stipendiis, nec stipendia sine Tributis haberi queunt.* Tac.

The second Remedy against Hate for Impositions is to make moderate Levies and rare. For as *Tiberius* the Emperor was wont to say, a Sheep should be fleeced not bleed: *Qui nimis emungit, elicit sanguinem.* Tac.

Thirdly,

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Thirdly, also to eschew the Offence of People, it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant Eye on Informers, Promoters, and such fiscal Ministers, whose Cruelty and covetous Proceedings do oftentimes occasion great Hate; but this mischief may be, though hardly, encountered, either by choosing honest Officers, or (proving otherwise) not only to remain them but to use them as Spunges: *Exprimendi post quam biberint.* Suet.

In all Impositions or Taxations, no Cruelty or Force ought to be used, the second cause to kindle Hate: and to meet with that mischief, nothing is better than to proceed moderately, and without Extremity: *Ne Boves ipsos, mox agros, postremo corpora servitio aut pæne tradant.* Tac.

The fourth Remedy is the Princes own Parsimony, not giving so largely to private Persons as thereby to be forced to take from the Multitude: *Magna opes non tam multa capiendò, quam haud multa perdendò, quærantur.* Mæcenas.

The

The last help against Hate is in Taxation to proceed equally, indifferently, and without Favor or Respect ; and that the Assessors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of People : *Populis maximam fidem rerum suarum habet.* Tac.

Touching Censure, which we numbered amongst the causes whereof Hate is conceived, much needeth not to be spoken, because the same is discontinued, or rather utterly forgotten ; yet doth it seem a thing necessary, being a certain Observation and Controlement of such evil Manners and Disorders, as were not by Law corrigible ; these Officers were of the *Romans* called *Magistri pudoris & modestie.* Livi.

To the Function of Censures these two things are anciently subject Manners, and Excess ; under Manners I comprehend Wantonness, Drunkenness, Dicing, Brawling, Perjury, and all such Lewdness as Modesty condemneth. These Disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of Censors in all Ages and Sexes, to the end that Idleness might be generally avoided. *Universa plebs*

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plebs habeat negotia sua, quibus a malo publico detineatur. Salust.

Excess includeth Riotousness, expence of Money, Prodigal House-keeping, Banquetting and Superfluity in Apparel, which things are the Mothers of many Mischiefs. It also seemeth in some sort perilous to the Prince that the Subject should exceed either in Covetize or Consuming: *Nemo nimis excedat, sive amicorum copia, sine opum.* Arist.

The Punishment inflicted upon these sorts of Offenders, were either Ignominy, or Pecuniary Punishments: *Censoris judicium damnato nihil affert nisi ruborem.* Tac.

The first and chiefest means to remove these Inconveniences, is the Princes own Example, whose Life being well censured, easily reduceth others to order. *Vita principis censura perpetua.* Plin.

Secondly, Those Disorders may be taken away without danger, if the Censures do proceed by degrees and leasurely; for the Nature of Man may not suddenly be altered. *Vitia quaedam tollit facilius princeps, si eorum sit patiens.* Sen.

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These are the chiefest Rules whereby to eschew Hate; but impossible it is for any Prince or Minister utterly to avoid it; for being himself good, he incurreth the Offence of all bad Folk, if he be Evil, Good Men will hate him; this Danger therefore Wise and Vertuous Princes have little regarded; because Hate may be gained as well by good as evil Doing: *Odia qui nimium timet, regnare nescit.* Sen.

One other means to remove this Error, is, to reward the good and well deserving Subjects; for no Man can think him Cruel, that for love to Vertue useth Austerity; which will appear, when he bestoweth Bountifully on the Good: *Premio & pœna Respublica continetur.* Solon.

The other Vice which indangereth the State of Princes, we call Contempt, being a certain base and vile Conceit, which entereth into the Subjects, Strangers or Servants, of the Prince and his Proceedings; for the Authority of a King may be resembled to the Powers of Mans Mind, whereunto the Hands, the Feet, the Eyes, do by consent obey:

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Vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt.
Livi.

The Causes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the Form of Government, Fortune, or the Prince's Manners; the Form of Government becometh Contemptible, when the Prince, desiring to be thought Merciful, ruleth rather Piti-fully than Justly; which manner of Pro-ceeding taketh away all Reverence in the People, and in lieu thereof, entereth Liberty, or at least a certain Boldness to offend: *Facultas faciendi quod cuilibet visum, non potest comprimere ingentem singulis hominibus pravitatem.* Tac.

Also to be Mutable, Irresolute, Light and Inconsiderate in bestowing the Honors and Offices of State, maketh the Prince Contemptible: *Qui presentibus fruitur, nec in longius consultat.* Arist.

But if Contempt be caused by Fortune, or as may be said more reasonably, by Destiny, and that those Friends do fail, who ought in Duty to defend the Prince and his Authority, then is there small hope to eschew Contempt: *Fato obnoxia viris.* Plaut.

The

The Prince's Manners do breed Contempt, when he yieldeth his Affections to Sensuality and Sloth, or if he incur the Suspicion of Simplicity, Cowardise, or any such Vice, unworthy the Dignity he beareth : Common People do sometimes also disesteem the Prince for external and light causes, as Deformity of Person, Sickness or such like : *Mos vulgi est, fortaita & externa ad culpam trahere.* Tac.

C H A P. XX.

*Of Dissidence and Dissimulation in
the Management of State Affairs.*

ALbeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy Praise, chietly in private Persons ; yet because all Men in their Actions do not so proceed, it becometh Wise Men and Princes, above others, at occasions to Semble and Dissemble ; for as in all Actions a Prince ought to be Slow and Advised ; so in Consent and Believing, Hastie and Facility

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lity is most dangerous; and though Credulity be rather an Error than a Fault, yet for Princes it is both Unfit and Perilous. Wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this Caution, *Nihil credendo, atque omnia cavendo.* Cic.

Notwithstanding he must not shew himself Dissident or Distrustful utterly; but as I wish he should not over-slightly believe all Men, so ought he not for small causes distrust every Man: *Multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli.* Sen.

Disimulation is as it were begotten by Diffidence, a Quality in Princes of so great Necessity, as moved the Emperor *Tiberius* to say, *Nescit regnare, qui nescit dissimulare.*

The Necessity of Disimulation is chiefly to be used with Strangers and Enemies; it also sheweth a certain Discretion in Magistrates, sometimes to disguise with Friends when no Offence doth thereof follow: *Doli non sunt aoli, nisi astra colas.* Plaut.

This kind of Craft, albeit in every Mans Conceit not praisable, is nevertheless tolerable, and for Princes and Magistrates (the same being used to
good

good ends) very necessary. But those Cunninges which are contrary to Vertue, ought not of Honest Men to be used; neither dare I commend Adulation and Corruption, though they be often used in Court, and are of some Learned Writers allowed: *Decipere pro moribus temporum, prudentia est.* Plin.

By great Subtilty and Frauds, contrary to Vertue and Piety, I mean Perjury and Injustice, which though all Men in Words detest, yet in Deeds are used of many, perswading themselves, by Cavillations and Sophistications, to excuse the Impiety of their False Oaths; as it is written of *Lyfander*, *Pueros talis, viros juramentis circumvenire solebat.* Plut.

C H A P. XXI.

*Of War Defensive and Invasive ;
with Instructions touching Laws
of Arms, Soldiers and Military
Discipline.*

THE Art Military is of all other Qualities most necessary for Princes, for without it they cannot be defended; force of Men only sufficeth not, unless the same be governed by Council, and Martial Wisdom: *Duo sunt quibus resp. servatur; in hostes fortitudo, & domi concordia.* Tac.

Military knowledge concerneth War, and every War is either Forreign or Domestical. Touching Forreign, it must be considered when it must be begun, how to continue it, and when to be ended; to begin War, a Prince is to take heed that the Cause be Just, and the Enterprize advisedly entred into: *Sunt enim & belli sic, et pacis jura, justoque ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes.* Livi.

The

The Laws of Arms are in all Common-weales to be duly observed; for to enter Fight rashly and without respect to Reason, were Beastly; also to Kill or Slay would work no better Effect, than that all Nations should without Mercy Murder one another: *Barbaro ritu eadem cæde, & sanguinem sanguine expiare.* Sal.

No War therefore is to be made, but such as is Just; and in every Just War these three things are to be looked into (*viz.*) That the Author be of Authority, That the Cause be Good, and the End Just; for in all States, the Prince, or they in whom the Sovereignty resteth, are the Just Authors of War; others have no such Authority: *Si quis privatim sine publico scito, pacem belumve fecerit, capitale esto.* Plato.

Wars are of two sortt; Defensive and Offensive; the one to Resist, the other to Invade; against Defence nothing can be said, because it is Natural and Necessary. *Est non modo justum sed etiam necessarium cum vi vis illata defenditur.* Cic.

Defensive War is of two sorts, either to defend thine own, or thy Friends; for it

is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth ; and therewith also by Arms to defend the Liberty of Country, Parents and Friends : *Nullam bellum a civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute.* Cic.

The like reason leadeth us to assist and protect Friends ; for the common Obligation of Humane Society doth so require : *Qui enim non obsistit si potest, injuria, tam est in vitio, quam si parentes aut patriam, aut socios deserat.* Cic.

Invasion is also just and allowable, but not ever ; for whoſo hath been robbed, or spoiled of his Lands or Goods, may lawfully seek Repossession by Force ; yet ſo as before any Force be used, he first civilly seek Restitution, wherein if Justice be denied, then is the use of Arms necessary : *Iustum bellum quibus necessariam ; & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes.* Liv.

Likewise Invasion is lawful against Barbarians, whose Religion and Impiety ought to be abhorred, chiefly if they be Potent and apt to offend ; for the cause of such War is Compulsion and Suppression of Evil : *Cui licentia*
iniqui-

iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur.
August.

Finally, To conclude this matter of Invasion, I say, That no Revenge, no desire of Honor or Empire, are any lawful Causes of War; but the intent thereof ought to be directed only to Defence and Security: For Wise Men do take Arms to win Peace, and in hope of Rest they endure Travel: *Ita bellum suscipiatur ut nihil aliud quam pax quaesita videatur.* Cic.

Having said somewhat against unjust War, let us speak of Temerity and unadvised War, an Enterprize worthy discommendation: *Omnes bellum sumunt facile, agerrime desinunt; nec in ejusdem potestate initium & finis est.* Sal.

A wise Prince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful Invasion, nor without sober and mature Deliberation enter into any War, as he that is unwilling to offend, yet of Courage enough to defend: *Nec provocet bellum, nec timeas.* Plin.

To make War three things are required, Money, Men and Arms; and to maintain a War, Provision and Council, are needful: Therefore a wise Prince,
before

before he begins a War, doth carefully consider what Forces and charge thereunto belongeth: *Diu apparandum est bellum, ut vincas melius.* Pub.

Above all other Provisions, care must be had, that Bread be not wanting; for without it neither Victory nor Life can be looked for: *Qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non preparat, vincitur sine ferro.* Vegetius.

Lastly, It behoveth a Prince always to have Arms in readiness, I mean, Harnels, Horses, Weapons, Artillery, Engines, Powder; and every other thing necessary either for Service on Horse or Foot: We may add hereunto Ships, and Shipping of all sorts, with every Furniture of Offence or Defence; for these Preparations make a Prince formidable, because no Man dare do or attempt Injury to that King or People, where Preparation is ever ready to revenge: *Qui desiderat pacem, preparat bellum.* Cass.

By Men we mean a Multitude of Subjects armed, trained to defend or offend: These are of two sorts, Captains and Soldiers; and Soldiers are either Footmen or Horse-men; the one of great use in the Cham-

Champion, the other in Mountainous places; also for defence or assault of Towns or Grounds fortified most necessary, and consequently meet for Service in all places, which moved *Tacitus* to say, *Omne in pedite robur.* Tac.

For sudden Service, Horses do seem most meet, and the Execution of any Enterprize is by them most speedily performed: Nevertheless the Actions of Foot-men do seem most certainly executed, chiefly if they be well armed, and skilfully lead; for so Experience hath of late time proved; besides, that they are of less Expence and of greater number: *In universum aestimanti plus in pedite robur.* Tac.

Having thus proved, that both Horse and Foot be necessary, let us remember, that unless they be serviceable, great Numbers are to small purpose: *Manibus opus est bello, non multis nominibus.* Livi.

To make Soldiers serviceable, consisteth in good Choice and good Discipline; the one at this day little regarded: *Emunt militem, non legunt.* Livi.

Soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able Number of Bodies,
and

and every Company composed of Men known one to the other; for thereby they are made the more Confident: But hereof is small heed taken, for commonly they are *Purgamenta urbium suarum.* Curt.

Touching Discipline, it seemeth that thereof the external Form, and not the certain Substance, is observed: For as in former Ages Soldiers endeavored to be Vertuous and Modest, so now they rather study to excel in Riot than in Martial Knowledge: *Exercitus lingua quam manu promptior, predator est focis, & ipsa praeda hostiam.* Sal.

For as much as Soldiers are made good by Election and Choice, it seemeth that the Foundation and Ground of Service consisteth in the Discretion and Judgment of those that have Authority to make Election; yet will we add, that they must be chosen of Natural Subjects, for Strangers are Covetous, and consequently Corruptible; they are also Mutinous and Cowardly: Their Custom likewise is to Rob, Burn and Spoil both Friends and Foes, and to consume the Princes Treasure: *Offa vides regum vacuis exsucta medullis.* Juven.

But

But the Native Soldier is Faithful and Obedient, Resolute in Fight, Loving to his Country, and Loyal to his Prince: *Gentes quæ sub regibus sunt, pro Deo colunt.* Curt.

Native Soldiers are of two sorts, (*viz.*) They that be in continual Pay, and they that are trained ready to serve, but do notwithstanding attend their own private Affairs, until they be called: The first are for all Princes necessary: *In pace decus, in bello præsidium.* Tac.

Of this sort no great number ought to be, as well to eschew Disorder, as also to save Expences. The second kind of Foot Soldiers are to be levied in Villages, as People more patient of Pains, and fit for the Wars; yet so judiciously disposed as the Citizens: *Odio præsentium & non cupidine mutationis.* Tac.

Touching the number of these extraordinary Soldiers, that must be referred to Discretion: *Bellum parare, simul & ærario parcere.*

To conclude, I say these numbers of ordinary and extraordinary Foot ought to be according to the number of the People, not inserting any Gentlemen; for Service on Horse-back is to them only proper:

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proper: *Alas rusticis non tribuo; in nobilitatem & in divites hac a pauperibus onera inclines.* Livi.

The most certain Notes whereby to conceive the Disposition of Men fit to become Soldiers, are these Five, The Country where they are Born, their Age, Proportion of Body, their Quality of Mind, and their Faculty. Touching,

First, Their Country, it is a thing apparently proved, that Mountainous Regions, or Barren places, and Northern Habitations, do breed Wits well disposed to the War: *Locorum asperitas hominum quoque ingentia durat.* Curt.

Secondly, The Age most apt for the War, was anciently observed to be about eighteen Years, and so the Romans used: *Facilius est ad virtutem instruire novos milites, quam revocare prateritos.* Veget.

Thirdly, The Stature of a Soldier ought to be observed: *Marius* liked best the longest Bodies; *Pyrrhus* preferred large and well proportioned Men; but *Vegetius* in his Choice, rather esteems Strength than Stature: *Utilius est fortes milites esse quam graves.* Veget.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, The Mind or Spirit of a Soldier ought to be considered, for that Mind which is quick, nimble, bold and confident, seemeth apt for War: He is also of good Hope, that loveth Honor more than Eale or Profit: In brief, *Is qui nihil metuit nisi turpem famam.* Sal.

Lastly, It is to be marked in what Art or Faculty a Man hath been bred; for it may be presumed that Fishers, Fowlers, Cooks, and others trained up in Effeminate Arts, are unfit for Martial Endeavor: And as these Men were, in respect of their Trade, thought unmeet, so in old time, Slaves and Masterless-Men were repulsed from Arms, as Persons Infamous: *Sed nunc tales sociantur armis quales Domini habere fastidiunt.* Veget.

How Soldiers ought to be chosen, these few words we have spoken, may suffice. Let us therefore say somewhat of Discipline. Choice findeth out Soldiers, but Discipline doth make and continue them fit for Service: *Paucos viros fortes natura procreat, bona institutione plures reddat industria.* Veget.

Discipline is a certain severe
Discipline. Confirmation of Soldiers in
 their Valor and Vertue, and
 is performed by four means, Exercise,
 Order, Compulsion and Example. The
 two first appertain to Valor, the third
 to Vertue, the last to both: But of Ex-
 ercise, first, I say, That a Soldier being
 chosen, ought to be informed in Arms,
 and used in Exercise and Action; the
 word *exercitium* importeth nothing else:
Exercitus dicitur, quod melius sit exerci-
tando Varro.

Order consisteth in dividing, dispo-
 sing, and placing of Men aptly on all
 Occasions to be commanded, as the
 Leaders shall direct: This matter re-
 quireth a large Discourse, and therefore
 I refer it to skilful Captains and Wri-
 ters, as *Polybius, Vegetius, De la Nonne,*
 and others.

Compulsion and Correction, is that
 which bridled and governeth the Man-
 ners of Soldiers; for no Order can be
 observed amongst them, unless they be
 Continent, Modest and Abstemious; for
 Continency is chiefly to be shewed in
 their Diet, and moderate Desires: De-

generat

generat a robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum. Tac.

The Modesty of a Soldier is perceived by his Words, Apparel and Actions: For to be a Vaunter, or Vain-glorious Boaster, is far unfit in him that professeth Honor or Arms, seeing true Vertue is silent: *Viri militia nati, factis magni, ad verborum linguaue certamina, rudes.* Tac.

The Apparel of a Soldier sheweth Modesty, if therein he do not exceed; for albeit it fitteth well the Profession of Arms, to be well armed and decently apparelled; yet all Superfluity favoreth of Ignorance or Vanity: *Horridum militem esse decet, non calatum auro argentoque sed ferro.* Livi.

Abstinence is also fit for all Soldiers; for thereby guided, they refrain from Violence and Insolency; by that Rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the Country where they serve, and likewise in their Lodgings: Never taking any thing from the Owner, nor committing any Outrage: *Vivant cum provincialibus jure civili, nec insolenscat animus qui se sensit armatum.*

The last mark of Discipline we called Example, under which word is comprehended Reward and Punishment: For Men are rewarded whensoever they receive for any excellent or singular Service, Honor or Riches: And for Evil, they have their due when they taste the Punishment thereunto belonging: *Necessarium est acrimus ille dimicet, quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militie & imperatoris judicium consuevit evehere.* Veget.

Likewise as Gold and Glory belongeth to good and well deserving Soldiers; so Punishment is due to those that be Vicious and Cowardly; for nothing holdeth Soldiers in Obedience so much as the Severity of Discipline: *Milites imperatorum potius quam hostem metuere debent.* Veg.

C H A P. XXII.

*Of Generals and Commanders, and
their requisite Abilities in Mar-
tial Enterprises and Expeditions.*

OF Soldiers let this little suffice, we will now speak of what Quality Chieftains and Leaders ought to be, for upon them dependeth the Welfare of whole Armies: *Militaris turba sine duce, corpus sine spiritu.* Curt.

A Chief or General in War, is either of his own Authority Chief, or a General that commandeth in the Name of another. Of the first sort are Emperors, Kings and Princes; of the other, be their Deputies, Lieutenants, Colonels, and indeed all general Commanders in the War: Now whether it be more Expedient that the Prince should command in Person or by Deputy, divers wise Men have diversly thought, therefore it may be thus distinguished; if the War do then only concern some parti-

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cular Part or Province, then may the same be performed by a Lieutenant; but if the whole Fortune of a Prince do thereupon depend, then is he to command in his own Person and not otherwise: *Dubius bellorum exemplis summæ rerum & imperii seipsum reservat.* Tac.

It therefore importeth the Prince sometimes by his own Presence, sometimes by his Deputation to perform that Office; but however occasion shall require, it ever behoveth that one only Commander ought to be, (for Plurality of Chieftains doth rarely or never work any good Effect) yet with this Caution that he be of Experience, and Wise: *In bellica præfectura major aspectus habendus peritiæ quam virtutis aut morum.* Arist.

The Qualities required in a Chieftain are these, Skill, Vertue, Providence, Authority and Fortune: By Skill we mean he should be of great Knowledge, and long Experience, or to make a sufficient Captain; the Information of others, or his own reading is not enough: *Qui nescit quis ordo agminis, quæ cura exploandi,*
quan-

quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus.
Cic.

Military Vertue is a certain Vigor or Force both of Body and Mind to exercise Soldiers as well in fained War as to fight with the Enemy ; and summarily a Captain ought to be *Laboriosus in negotio, fortis in periculo, industrius in agendo, celeris in conficiendo.* Cic.

Next to Vertue we placed Providence as necessary in great Captains ; for being of such Wisdom, they will not hazard nor commit more to Fortune than necessity shall inforce ; yet true it is, Fools and vulgar Folks, that commend or discommend Actions according to Success, were wont to say, *Cunctatio servilis, statim exequi, Regium est.* But advised and provident Captains do think, *Temeritas præterquam quod stulta, est etiam infelix.* Livi.

Albeit Providence be the best mean of good Speed, yet some Captains of that Quality and in Skill excelling, have been in their Actions unlucky, when others of less Sufficiency have marvellously prevailed ; we may therefore reasonably say with Cic. *Quod olim Maximo, Marcello,*

Scipioni, Mario & ceteris magnis Imperatoribus non solum propter virtutem, sed etiam propter fortunam sapius imperia mandata, atque exercitus esse commissos. Cic.

Lastly, We wished Authority to be in Chieftains, for it greatly importeth what Opinion or Conceit the Enemy hath of such a Governor, and likewise how much his Friends and Confederates do esteem him; but the chief and only means to maintain Authority, is Auste-
rity and Terror: *Dux Authoritatem maximam severitate sumat, omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet, nulli errantium credatur ignoscere. Veget.*

Also Experience hath proved, that such Chieftains as were affable and kind to their Soldiers, were much loved, yet did they incur a Contempt; but on the other side, those that commanded severely and terribly, although they gained no good Will, yet were they ever obeyed: *Dux facilis inutilis. App.*

C H A P. XXIII.

*Of Councils in War, and Directions
Tactick and Stratagematick, with
Advice how to make an honorable
Peace.*

AFTER Men found and framed fit for the War, to small or no purpose shall they serve, unless they be imployed by Wisdom or good Council: *Non minus est Imperatoris consilio quam vi perficere.* Tac.

Council in War is of two sorts, direct Council and indirect; the first sheweth a plain and orderly course for proceeding, as to lay hold on occasion; for as in all other Humane Actions occasion is of great Force: *Occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus.* Veget.

As Occasions presented are means of good Success, so Fame worketh great Effects in the Wars, therefore it becometh a Captain to be Constant, and not apt to believe the vain Rumors and Reports of Men: *Male imperatur, cum regit vulgus duces suos.* Sen.

Confidence is also to be eschewed, for no Man is sooner surpris'd; than he who feareth least; also Contempt of the Enemy hath been occasion of great Discomfitures, therefore as a Captain ought not to fear, so should he not contemn his Enemy: *Nimia fiducia semper obnoxia.* Æmyl.

As Security, and overmuch Estimation of our own Vertue or Valor is hurtful, so doth it import every good Captain to be well informed, not only of his own Forces but also of what Strength the Enemy is; likewise it behoveth him to know the Situation of the Country, and the Quality of the People, with every other Circumstance. Moreover, the Generals Honor and Capacity ought to be known, with the Condition and Nature of the Enemy: *Impetus acres cunctatione languescunt, aut in perfidiam mutantur.* Tac.

Temerity in War is also dangerous, for wise Captains were wont not to Enterprise any thing without Deliberation and good Opportunity, unless they were thereunto by Necessity inforced: *In rebus asperis & tenui spe, fortissima quaque consilia tutissima sunt.* Liv.

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Some wise Men, not Superstitiously but Discreetly, do think prodigious Signs from Heaven, or on Earth, are not to be neglected, neither are Dreams in time of War to be contemned: *Nam amat benignitas numinis, seu quod merentur homines, seu quod tangitur eorum affectione, his quoque rationibus prodere quæ impendent.* Æmi.

A wise Captain will also wait Opportunities, and spy out fit times when the Enemy is wearied, or pretending fear, draw him into danger; which Advantages, with many other, are gained chiefly by observing of time: *Quia si in occasionis momento, cujus prætervolat opportunitas, cunctatus paulum fueris, nequicquam mox omissam querare.* Liv.

Next the Observation of Time, the Place is to be well considered, whether it be for thine Advantage or thine Enemies: *Amplius prodest locus sæpe quam virtus.* Veget.

Thirdly, It importeth much, that Men be well ordered, trained, and prepared for the Fight; for the want of Art is cause of many Disadvantages, and many times a small Supply of choice Soldiers
on

on Horse-back or Foot, doth seem to the Enemy very Terrible; likewise a sudden Shout or Conceit hath amazed a whole Army: *Milites vanis & inanibus, magis quam justis formidinis causis morventur.* Curt.

Fourthly, It were to good purpose, that in ordering of Men for Fight, Soldiers of one Country or Nations, should be ranged together, and above all, to foresee that the least loss of Blood be among the Natural Subjects, and so handle the Matter, that the chief Slaughter light upon Strangers and Mercenaries: *Ingens victorie decus, citra domesticum sanguinem bellanti.* Tac.

The Generals own Courage and lively Disposition to Fight, will greatly animate the Multitude of Soldiers, as a contrary Countenance or Appearance of Fear, will exceedingly Amaze and Daunt: *Necesse est ad fugam parati sint, qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare.* Veget.

It were also for thy great Advantage, that the Forces should be ordered for the Fight, before the Enemy be prepared.

First,

First, For that thou maist the better perform, what thou thinkest fit to be done.

Secondly, That thereby thine own Forces will thereof receive great Courage, being readiest to assail the Enemy, and to begin the Fight: *Plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti.* Livi.

After Victory it is not the best Policy to execute the Enemies with extream Cruelty, but proceed Moderately, for it shall suffice the Victory is thine: *Clansis ex desperatione crescit audacia, & cum spei nihil est, sumit arma feruido.* Veget.

Lastly, I would advise that the General should be wary in his Actions, and in every Enterprize to frustrate the Soldiers from Spoils and Pillage: *Sape obstitit vincentibus prævum inter ipsos certamen, commissio hoste spolia coniectanda.* Tac.

Of direct Councils, let that we have said suffice. We will now speak of Councils Indirect, commonly called by the Greek Word, *Stratagemas* or *Subtile Practises*: Which manner of Proceeding, hath been, in times past, of divers Grave Writers condemned: *Vir nemo mentis alte clanculum velit occidere hostem.* Eurip.

Not.

Notwithstanding the Opinion of this, and divers other Writers worthy Credit, it seemeth reasonable, and in Piety allowable, that Stratagems and Subtilties may be used in the War, yet with such Caution, as the same may stand with Fidelity and Honor; for Fraud being used, contrary to Contracts and Agreements made with the Enemy, is mere Treachery: As to Poyson him or her, a Murtherer to kill him, were plain Impiety: *Fœderatum injuste fallere, impium.* Livii.

Also out of the War covertly to kill a particular Enemy by secret Assault or Practice, is not warrantable, either by Faith or Honor; yet to use all Craft, Cunning and Subtilty-in open War, is both allowable and praisable; and so is thought by Christian Writers: *Cum justum bellum suscipitur, ut aperte pugnet quis aut ex insidiis, nihil ad justitiam interest.* Aug.

The same is also approved by divers Authors of good Credit: *Confice si ve dolo seu stricto cominus esse.* The same is also affirmed by Xenophon, *Reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolo.*

Thus

Thus having briefly touched what Counsels are required in War, let us consider how Victory is to be used, for the end of every good War is Peace; to the enjoying whereof, three things are required, Wariness, Mercy and Modesty; because over-great Confidence may happily impeach the end of good Success: *Res secunda negligentiam creant.* Livi.

I also wish the Victory to be handled Mercifully, because all Conquests are in their own Nature cruel enough: And the Ire of Insolent Soldiers, forces the Conquered to become Desperate: *Gravissime morsus irritate necessitatis.* Curt.

To proceed Modestly, is also an honorable Quality in him that conquereth; for in prosperous Fortunes, Men do hardly refrain covetous and proud Doings; yea, some good and great Captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them: *In rebus secundis etiam egregii Duces insolescunt.* Tac.

After Victory followeth Peace: For if War did ever continue, no State or Government could stand: Therefore how great, or how long soever the War be, the end must be Peace; the name whereof
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is not only Sweet, but also Comfortable :
Pax una triumphis innumeris potior.

Peace is not only good and profitable to him that is Victorious, but also to those that are victored: *Pacem reduci velle victori, expedit, victo necesse est.* Tac.

Nevertheless until good and honorable Peace be offered, Arms may not be laid aside: Wherein I wish Tully's Advice to be followed: *Bellum gerendum est ; si bellum omitemus, pace nunquam fruemur.* Livi.

In Treaty of Peace, two things must be considered: First, That the Conditions be Honorable. To condescend to any Base Conditions, is unto a Princely Mind not only great Indignity, but also Intolerable: *Cum dignitate potius cadendum, quam cum ignominia serviendum.* Plut.

It also importeth, the Peace should be simple, true and unfeigned; for all feigned and dissembling Amity is to be doubted: *Pace suspecta tutius est bellum.* Mithrid.

The fittest Season to speak of Peace, is either when the War beginneth, or
during

during the time that the Enemies be of equal Force ; for if the War continueth, it must behove the Weaker to yield to Necessity : Not unlike the Ship-master, who to save himself doth cast the greatest part of his Loading into the Sea : *Necessitati pare, quam ne diu quidem superant.* Livi.

Finally, Having generously defended thy self, and performed all things required in a magnanimous Captain, and finding nevertheless thy Force insufficient, it cannot be dishonorable to accept Peace. Wherefore laying aside Hatred and Hope, which are but weak Supporters, thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved Discretion of an honorable Enemy : *Victores secundæ res in miserationem ex ira vertunt.* Livi.

Now for as much as every Peace promiseth Rest and Quiet, as well to the Victorious as to the Victored ; we may add thereunto, that the Prince Victorious receiveth thereby Honor, Profit and Security. For although his Happiness may occasion Hope of great Success, yet in respect of Fortunes Mutability, it shall be Good and Glorious to listen to Peace :

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Decorum principi est cum victoriam prope in manibus habeat, pacem non abnuere, ut sciant omnes te & suscipere iuste bellum, & finire. Livi.

It seemeth also the more Honorable ; for who so is Victorious, doth give Peace and not take it : He also sheweth himself Discreet by using a Moderation in Victory, and no Extremity in Spoiling, which our Wise and Godly Writers have commended : *Pacem contemnentes, & gloriam appetentes, pacem perdunt & gloriam. Bern.*

Peace is also Profitable for the Victorious, because continual War breedeth Weariness, and of violent Proceeding Desperation and Peril cometh : *Maximi & mortiferi morsus esse solent morientium bestiarum. Sen.*

Likewise Peace is more assured than any Victory. Hope of the one is in thine own Power ; the other in the Hand of God: Add thereunto the force of Fortune, which hath great power in all Humane Actions : *In rebus secundis nihil in quenquam superbe ac violenter consulere decet, nec presenti credere Fortune, cum quid vesper ferat, incertus sis. Sen.*

Also

Also Conditions of Peace ought to be reasonably and freely bestowed: For no People can live contented under such a Law as forceth them to loath the State wherein they are. *Misera pax bello bene mutatur.* Sen.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Civil War, with the Causes and Remedies thereof.

THE greatest and most grievous Calamity that can come to any State is Civil War; for therein Subjects take Arms against their Prince or among themselves, whereof followeth a Misery more Lamentable than can be described. *Non atas, non dignitas quenquam protegit, quo minus stupra cedibus, & cades stupris misceantur.* Tac.

The first Cause of Civil War proceedeth of Destiny, for God in his own Divine Providence foreseeeth many Years before, that great and mighty Empires

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shall

thall be ruined. *In se magna ruunt : la-
tis hinc numina rebus Crescendi posuere mo-
dum* ——— Lucan.

The second Cause is, Excess, Rior, and Dissolute Life; for nothing breedeth Civil Fury so soon as over great Happinels; also pompous Apparel, Banquetting and prodigal Spending consumeth Riches, and Plenty is turned into Poverty; for by these means are Men brought into Desperation. *Rapacissimo cuique ac perditissimo, non agri aut fenus sed sola instrumenta vitiorum manebunt.* Tac.

Now to consider how Destiny might be eschewed, were in vain : For such a Remedy no Wit or Wisdom can devise, being the Decree of God, no doubt it is inevitable. *Ita fato placuit, nullius rei eodem semper loco stare fortunam.* Sen.

There is nothing exempt from the peril of Mutation ; the Earth, Heavens, and whole World is thereunto Subject. *Cercis eunt cuncta temporibus ; nasci debent, crescere, extinguí.* Sen.

Touching the second Causes of Civil War some Remedies may be used, because it proceedeth of Faction, Sedition

or

or Tyranny. I call Faction a certain Association of divers Persons combined to the Offence of others. It proceedeth often of private or publick Displeasure, and more often of Ambition. *Nemo eorum qui in Rep. versantur, quos vincat, sed a quibus vincatur, aspiciis.* Sen.

1. Factions are of two sorts; for either they consist of many or of few Persons: both be dangerous, but the former more apt to take Arms; and that Party which proveth weakest, prayeth Arms of Foreign Forces.

2. The other Faction wherein are fewer partakers, be commonly great Personages or Men of more Importance than ordinary People; and that proveth most Perilous and Bloody. *Nobilium factiones trahunt ad se, & in partes, universum etiam populum.* Arist.

Albeit some wise Men have held Opinion that Factions are necessary, yet cannot that concept be reasonably maintained, unless it be upon Confines, and in such places where Conspiracy is feared, which Cato in his private Family used. *Semper contentiones aliquas aut dissensum inter servos callide*

serebat, suspectum habens nimiam concordiam orum, metuensque. Plut.

Factions against the Nobility, are sometimes suppressed by forbidding Colours, or unknown Bagdes to be worn, also to inhibit Names or Watch-words of Mutinies is necessary, which was *Mecenas* Counsel to *Augustus*; and *Aristotle* thinketh it fit that Laws should be made against the Factions of Noblemen. *Nobilium contentiones & partes etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari.* Arist.

Another Cause of Civil War, we call Sedition, which is a sudden Commotion or Assembly of Common People against their Prince or his Magistrates: the Original of which Disorders may proceed of divers Causes, but chiefly of Oppression. *Imminentium periculorum remedium, ipsa pericula arbitrari.* Arist.

Again, Fear may be the occasion of Sedition, as well in him that hath done Injury, as in him that looketh to be injured, and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh. It may proceed also of over great Mildness in

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The Arts of Empire. 101

Government. *Non miseriis licentia sed
licentia, tantum concitum turbarum,
lascivire magis plebem quam scire.*
Livi.

Sedition many times ariseth of Poverty, or of the Artificers, whose Arts are grown out of Use, and consequently no means whereof they can live. *Semper in civitate, quibus opes nullæ sunt, bonis invidem, vetera odere, nova expectant, odio rerum suarum mutari omnia student.* Sab.

Lastly, Sedition cometh of Tyranny, Insolency, or Mutinous Disposition of certain Captains, Cavaliers, or Ring-leaders of the People; for albeit the Multitude is apt to Innovation, yet doth it stand firm, until some first Mover taketh the matter in hand. *Multitudo omnis, sicut mare, per se immobilis.* Livi.

Of these Movers some are Ambitious, who wanting other means to Aspire, hope by practice of Sedition, to compals their Designs; or else they are Unthrifts, who having consumed their own, seek by Violence to possess themselves of other Mens: Or else they

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are vain and light Persons, that without Cause or Reason, attempt Innovation, themselves know not for what. *Non tam pramiis periculorum, quam ipsis periculis læti, pro certis & olim partis, nova, ambigue ancipitia malunt.*

Thus having told the Causes of Sedition, I wish the Remedies were prepared. *Omne malum nascens facile opprimitur, inveteratum fit plerumque robustius.* Cic.

The first way to suppress Sedition, is Eloquence and excellent Perswasion, which oftentimes worketh great Effects among the Multitude; chiefly when it proceedeth from some Reverend and grave Person, for his Wisdom and Integrity of Life honored: For the Prince himself is not to take Office in hand, unless necessity so enforce: *Integra autoritas principis majoribus remediis servetur.* Tac.

If Perswasion cannot prevail, then Force must compel: But before such violent Proceedings, Use, Art and Cunning, either to appease the People, or at least to disunite them; and rather if the Prince do offer fair and promise plau-

plausibly. *Verba apud populum plurimum valent.* Tac.

It is lawful also in such Cases for Princes to use Subtilty; and the same not prevailing, to wash away the Stain thereof with Clemency: For when Arms laid down, and every one yielded, general Punishment were needless. *Omnium culpa fuit, paucorum sit pœna.* Tac.

The last Cause of Sedition we named Tyranny, which is a certain violent Government, exceeding the Laws of God and Nature. The difference between Kings and Tyrants is this; the one imployeth Arms in defence of Peace, the other useth them to terrifie those of whom his Cruelty hath deserved Hate. *Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem fecerint, pacem appellant.* Tac.

The quality of Tyrants is to esteem Promoters more then good Ministers, because those Men are the Scourge of infinite others. They are also Protectors of impious Persons, and stand in daily doubt of Noble and Virtuous

Men. *Nobilitas, opes, amissi gestique honores, pro crimine: Et ob virtutes certissimum exitium.* Tac.

Tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of Letters and Civil Life, to the end all Arts should be exiled, and Barbarism introduced. *Pellunt sapientia professores, & omnes bonas artes in exilium agant.* Tac.

These and such like, be the Conditions of Tyrants, who for the most part are deposed and slain; for as Kings live long and deliver their Dominions to their Children and Posterity: So Tyrants being feared and hated of all Men, cannot continue in their Estate.

*Ad generum Cereris sine corde & vulnere
pauci
Descendunt reges & sicca morte Tyranni.*
Juvin.

The Remedies of these Mischiefs which proceed from the Violence of such a Prince, are Persecution or Patience. Many generous Spirits have used the first; perswading themselves rather
to

to dye, than endure the sight of a Tyrant. Also the *Grecians* did think it a Service acceptable to Murther the Person of such an impious Prince. *Græci homines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui Tyrannos necaverunt.* Cic.

Nevertheless, in Christian Consideration, the other Course is to be taken: Let Patience therefore incounter this mischief; for seeing all Kings, as well the bad as the good be sent by God, they must be indured. *Res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem.* Homer.

Persecution is not only perilous, but for the most part unfortunate: For therefore present Revenge is taken by that Prince that succeedeth. *Factoris ejus ultor est, quisquis successerit.* Tac.

The Murther of Tyrants is also followed with many inconveniences worse than Civil War it self. *Principes boni, votis expetendi, qualescunque tolerandi.* Tac.

For as Fire, Floods, and other inevitable Plagues are necessarily to be suffered: So evil Princes in their Covetousness and Cruelty ought to be patiently indured, because their Office is

to command, and Subjects must Obey.
Indigna, digna habenda sunt, Rex que facit. Sen.

And as it is the use of vulgar People to find Faults in the long Reign of Princes; so the Ambition of great Subjects is desirous of Novelty. *Præfens imperium subditis semper grave.* Thucyd.

To conclude, we say that the best Remedy against Tyranny, is Patience: For so long as Men are, so long will Vices be. *Regum ingenia toleranda, neque usui crebræ mutationes.* Tac.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

*A Collection of Political Observations
(confirmed by Reason and Experience)
advertising Princes, Statesmen
and private Persons how to
demean themselves in all Fortunes
and Events.*

TO the Perfections of Men, Three things are necessarily required; Nature, Nurture and Use: The first giveth Capacity, Aptness and Understanding; which are Graces from Above. Nurture, is Learning, Knowledge, Art, or Order. Use, is Practice, Experience, and orderly Observation; whereof may be conceived, that Nature alone sufficeth not; nor can Nurture work any good effect, where natural Aptness wanteth; and they can frame no Perfection, unless Experience be also conjoined. *Nemo nascitur sapiens, sed fit.* Sen.

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Ambassadors, Negotiants, and generally all other Ministers of mean Fortune, in Conversation with Princes and Superiors, must use great respect, shewing themselves rather Ceremonious than Presumptuous, and acknowledge their Obligation great, for the Favor and Grace, they find in those which might command them.

It is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the Actions of Men by their Success: for oftentimes some Enterprises attempted by good Counsel, end unfortunately; and others unadvisedly taken in hand, have happy Success. Who so then commendeth inconsiderate Counsels for their fortunate Event, thereby encourageth Men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know, and by Experience have proved.

In Actions publick, and every other matter of great moment, the beginning is well to be considered: For afterwards it lieth not in our power, without dishonor to abandon what was begun.

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The time doth not always serve, nor is apt occasion always offered to Enterprize what would; yer who so doth expect every Opportunity, shall either attempt nothing at all, or if he do, the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage.

When any Resolution is taken, either with over great haste, or too much Affection, seldom it receiveth good success: For he that doth the one, hath no leisure to consider; the other transporteth the Mind so as it cannot conceive more than that which presently presseth.

To these we add others, I mean some of them that have leisure, and are void of Affection, yet for want of natural Capacity, or for continual Negligence in their doings, never bring any thing well to pass.

Who so desireth to be beloved in a Commonwealth, must rest content with that which Men do give, and the Laws allow him to take: So shall he neither incur Danger nor Envy: for indeed, that which is taken or extorted from others, and not that which is given, doth make Men hated.

Arms

Arms, Laws and Religion, may not in any well governed State be disjoined; every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united.

In Actions of War, Courage and Conduct are of great Necessity; yet all good Government consisteth in using the Virtues Moral; and in handling the matter of Martial Policy, it is fit to imitate the Proceedings of ancient and approved Captains.

Among Mortal Men, there is nothing more common than to believe the Estate of one Man to be better than another; for hereof it cometh, that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel, than to enjoy his own with rest.

The state of Princes is good, being well used; so is the Fortune of private Men, if therewith they be contented. The rich Man liveth happily, so long as he useth his Riches temperately; and the poor Man that patiently endureth his Wants, is Rich enough.

Whensoever a Man is so dangerously distressed, as either proceeding or standing, he liveth in like peril, then doth
it

it behove him in any wise, to resolve upon Action. The reason is, that so long as nothing is done, the same Accidents that caused his Dangers, do still remain in their former force ; but if he endeavor to enterprize somewhat, either he may meet with means to make him secure, or at the hardest, shew himself of so great Courage and Wit, as he dare and can attempt a way to do it.

It seemeth a thing of great difficulty, or rather impossible for any Prince or Magistrate to eschew the evil speech and bad report of Men ; for if they be good and virtuous, then they incur the backbiting of lewd Persons ; if evil, then will all good Men exclaim against them.

All Commonwealths ought to desire Peace, yet it is necessary ever to be prepared for the War ; because Peace disarmed is weak, and without Reputation : Therefore the Poets feign, that *Pallas* the Goddess of Wisdom did always appear armed.

Every Prince (well advised) ought to govern his Subjects and Servants in such sort, that by his Affability and Virtue they may be induced rather to
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serve voluntarily, then for Pay or hope of Preferment. For otherwise doing, whensoever the Prince shall want means to pay, the Subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve. But he that faithfully loveth, doth neither in Prosperity become Arrogant, nor in contrary Fortune retire, or complain of the small favor he findeth: For (till death) Love and Life remain at the Princes Commandment.

Where poor Men find Justice, evil Men are punish'd, Measures and Weights be just, Youth well nurtured, and old Folk free from Avarice, there is the Commonwealth good and perfect.

In War between Neighbors, Neutrality is commendable; for by that means we eschew many Troubles and great Expences, so long as the Forces of either side be so equal in strength, as we need not to fear the Victory of any: For so long their Discord is our Security, and oftentimes offereth us means to increase our own State and Reputation.

The chief Reasons to move War, are, the Justice of the Cause, the Facility of Success, and the Profit of the Victory.

In

In all Humane Actions it behoveth to accommodate the Council of Men unto present Necessity, and never to expose Security to manifest Peril, nor hope of that which without great Difficulty or Impossibility cannot be obtained.

It is the Nature of Men, having escaped one Extreme, which by force they were constrained long to endure, to run Headlong into the other Extreme, forgetting that Vertue doth always consist in the mean.

The Multitude is inclined to Innovation, and easily induced by false Persuasion, and consequently easily transported by Seditious Leaders.

Men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten Danger and Terror; yet unless these Perils, by some new Accident, be daily revived, that Fear by little and little vanisheth, and Security recovereth the place.

Whoso findeth himself contemned, or not respected, becometh Discontent; which Humor in generous Minds, breedeth oftentimes Adventerous Imaginations, whereof Audacious Attempts have followed, chiefly in Persons of Authority

and Reputation; for he that hopeth no Good, feareth no Evil: Yet true it is, that dangerous Enterprises, the more they be thought upon, the less Hope they give of good Success, for which reason Conspiracies not suddenly executed, are for the most part revealed or abandoned.

All People do naturally imitate the Manners of their Prince, and observing his Proceedings, resolve to Hate or Love him: But if they happen once to Hate the Prince, then his Doings, Good or Evil, are afterwards not Good; but if at the beginning he gained the Love of the People, then every bad Action is reputed a Vertue; as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good Cause or Reason.

Greatly are Princes deceived, if in the Election of Ministers, they more respect their own particular Affection, than the Sufficiency of the Person elected.

A Prince having conquered any new Dominion, is thereby rather incumbered than strengthened, unless the same be after well governed; and seldom is it
seen

seen, that a Principality, by ill means gotten, hath been long enjoyed.

As to the Perfection of the whole Body, soundness of Head only sufficeth not, unless the other Members also do their Office; even so it is not enough that a Prince be Faultless, but it behoveth also that the Magistrates and Ministers should perform their Duty.

Great Princes rarely resist their Appetites, as for the most part private Men can; for they being always honored and obeyed, do seldom with Patience indure the want of any thing reasonable, as being perswaded that what they desire is Just, and that their Commandment hath power to remove all Difficulties.

All Men are naturally good, when no respect of Profit or Pleasure draws them to become Evil. But this Worlds Corruption, and our Frailty is such, as easily and often for our particular Interest we incline to the worst; which was the cause that wise Law-makers found out Reward and Punishment; the one to incite Men to Good, the other to fear them from being Evil.

*Tam bene quam
male facta pre-
munt. Mart.*

A Tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his Estate by three means. First, He practiseth to hold all Subjects in extreme Awe, and to be basely minded, to the end they should want Courage to take Arms against him. Secondly, He kindleth Diffidence and Discord among the Great Men; thereby to remove occasion of Conspiracy and Combination. Lastly, He holdeth them Disarmed and Idle, so as they neither know nor can attempt any thing against him.

To govern, is nothing else but to hold Subjects in Love and Obedience; for in respect of the end, they ought not, and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the Governor's Will and their Duty.

The Laws and Ordinances of a Common-weale made at the beginning thereof when Men were good, do often prove unprofitable when they are become evil; and therefore new Laws are made according to the Accidents which happen.

The Discontent and Disorder of People is ever occasioned by the Inequality of their Goods, because the Poorer sort would be made equal to the Rich; but
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the Offence that grows among great Men is the desire of Honor; for they being equal, do endeavor to aspire to equal Authority.

A Prince that desireth, by means of his Ambassador, to deceive any other Prince, must first abuse his own Ambassador, to the end he should do and speak with more Earnestness, being indeed perswaded that the Intent and Meaning of his Master is Simple, which happily would not, were he privy that his Prince's Meaning were to Dissemble. This course is also commonly holden by those, that by Employment of a third Person, would perswade any thing Feigned or False.

For the Performance of Conditions of Treaty of Peace, or League of Amity, the Promises, Vows and Oaths of Princes are of great Effect; and because Fidelity in a Man is not ever certain, and time doth daily offer Occasions of Variation, there is no Assurance so Secure and Good, as to stand so prepared, as the Enemy may want able means how to offend.

To resolve in Matters Doubtful, or answer Requests which we are not willing to grant, the least offensive way is not to use direct Denial, but by delays prolong the time, and so in effect, afford good Expectation.

The old Proverb saith, *Magistratus virum ostendit*; which is no less true than Ancient; for Men in such Fortune, are occasioned not only to make proof of their Sufficiency, but also to discover their Affections; and the more their Greatness is, the less respect they have to contain those Passions which are natural.

Albeit great Troubles and continual Adversity seem Insupportable, yet is there nothing more Dangerous, than overmuch Prosperity; and being pressed by new Appetites, they disturb their own Security.

In speaking of Occurrents doubtful, it is always Wisdom to feign Ignorance, or at least alledge that we believe them not; for most commonly they are utterly untrue, or far other than vulgarly is believed.

The Actions of Men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good Success; attributing that to Council which sometimes is due to Fortune.

The Multitude of Men were wont to be more pleased with sudden than slow Resolutions; and many times account those Enterprises Generous, which are rashly and inconsiderately attempted.

Great Difference there is between Subjects Desperate, and others which are only Discontented; for the one desire nothing but present Alteration, which they endeavor with all Hazard; the other wish for Innovation, inciting any Motion or Practice, because their Intent is to attend time, and that occasion may present it self.

A Benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured, doth not suffice to raze the same out of his Memory, chiefly if the Benefit be given at such time as no mere Motion, but Necessity may seem the occasion thereof.

That Peace ought to be desired, which removed Suspition, which assureth us from Peril, which bringeth Quiet certain, and acquitteth us of Expences; but when it worketh contrary Effects, it may be called a dangerous War, covered with the name of Deceitful Trust, not unlike a perilous Poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsome Medicine.

The Effect of things, and not External show, or seeming, ought to be regarded; yet it is credible what great Grace is gained by courteous Speech and Affability; the reason whereof is, as I suppose, that every Man believeth he doth merit more than indeed he is worthy, and consequently holdeth himself injured, whensoever he findeth Men not to afford him like Estimation.

Men ought in any wise, to refrain to do or say any thing which may offend, for which respect it were great Folly, either in presence or absence, to utter displeasing Speech, unless necessity inforceth.

The Matters whereof Counsellors are chiefly to consider, are five, The Prince's Revenue, Peace and War, De-

Defence, Traffick, and what Laws are to be made.

In giving Council divers things are to be observed; but amongst them are two of most Importance: First, It behoveth, that he who is counselled should be Wise; for seeing Counsel is nothing else but a certain considerate Discourse of things to be done or not done, if he who is to take Counsel be not of Discretion, then will he refuse all good Advice offered, and rather incline to that which his own Fancy affecteth, because the want of Judgment draweth him to take pleasure in vain things; and as one incapable of what is good and true, will follow that which is Evil and False: So on the other side, if he that giveth Counsel be not Faithful, then will he a Thousand ways disguise and dissemble the Truth; and consequently miscarry the Mind of him that is Counsell'd; yea in the end utterly abuse him.

The Affairs and Proceedings of the World, are so variable, and accompanied with so many Chances and Changes, as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best; therefore Experience informeth,
that

that the Conjectures of the most Wise, prove vain and uncertain. I therefore mislike the Judgment of those Men, that will let slip Opportunity of present Good (though it be small) for fear of a future Evil, notwithstanding it be greater unless the Evil be very near at hand, or certain. For if that do not follow which is feared, then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was desired.

Whensoever a general Opinion is conceived, of the singular Vertue and Knowledge of any Man, although he be indeed Ignorant, and far unworthy that Account, yet it is hard to remove such a settled Conceit: The Reason is, That Men having at the first given Credit to common Report, do make thereof so deep an Impression, as afterwards, without great Difficulty, cannot be removed.

The Bodies of Men, Munition and Money, may justly be called the Sinews of War, yet of them the two first are more necessary, for Men and Arms have means to find Money and Meat; but Money and Meat cannot so easily find Soldiers and Swords.

One wise General having but a Thousand Men, is more to be feared and esteemed, than twenty Commanders of equal Authority; for they being commonly of divers Humors, or judging diversily, do never, or very rarely, what is to be done, and consequently lose much time before any Resolution can be taken.

A Prince of mean Force, ought not in any wise to adventure his Estate upon one days Fight; for if he be Victorious he gaineth nothing but Glory; but if he lose, he is utterly ruined.

The most part of Men are delighted with Histories, for the Variety of Accidents therein contained; yet are there few that will imitate what they read, and find done by others; being perswaded that Imitation is not only hard but impossible, as though the Heavens and Men were changed in their Motion, or Order and Power, which they anciently had.

The Nature of Men is such, as will not endeavor any thing Good, unless they be forced thereunto; for where Liberty aboundeth, there Confusion and Disorder

Disorder follow. It is therefore supposed, that Hunger and Poverty make Men Industrious; but good Laws inforce them to be Honest; for if Men were of themselves good, then Laws were needless.

There are two kinds of Adulation: The first proceedeth from a Subtle Malice: The second cometh by an ordinary use of Conversation; the one tendeth to Profit and Deceiving; the other hath no farther Design, than a Respect or Fear to offend; whereunto the most Honest are in some sort bound. Whoso bindeth himself to Flattery, doth thereby bewray his Intent, either to gain, or not to lose that he hath. For the Person flattered, is always superior to him that doth Flatter, or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead. It may therefore be inferred, that only Men of base and miserable Condition, and such as cannot help or hurt, be free from Flatterers. And contrariwise, Magnanimous and Fortunate Folk, proud Men, and such as content themselves with their present Estate, are seldom found to be Flatterers.

Every

Every wise Prince doth presuppose, that Times of Trouble may come, and that all such Occasions he shall be forced to use the Service of Men diversly qualified. His Study therefore is, in the mean time so to entertain them, as when those Storms arise, he may rest assured to command them; for whosoever perswades himself, by present Benefits, to gain the good Will of Men, when Perils are at hand, shall be deceived.

In ancient times Princes and Governors were wont, when Peace and Security were most like to continue, to find or feign Occasions to draw their Subjects to Fear, to the end that Doubt might move them to be more careful of their own well-doing; for well they knew it a general Defect in Men, to be reachless, and never willing to use Industry; unless by necessity they were constrained.

All Histories do shew, and wise Politicians do hold it necessary, that for the well governing of every Common-weal, it behoveth to presuppose that all Men are Evil, and will declare themselves so to be, when occasion is offered; for albeit
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some Inconvenience doth lye hid for a time, it proceedeth from a covert occasion, which for want of Experience, was not found, until Time the Mother of Truth discover it.

Neutrality is always a thing Dangerous and Disallowable, because it offendeth all Parties: He that is Strong looketh to be assisted in his Greatness; and he that is Weak, not being defended, holdeth himself offended; the one is not assured from Foes, and the other holdeth no Friends.

Albeit Neutrality procure present Quiet and Security, during the Troubles of others; yet after the same falleth out a Disadvantage, because it entertaineth a certain Fallshenness, and so in short space will be perceived; not unlike those Men that borrow upon Usury; for albeit they enjoy a certain time, without Trouble or Charge, yet the same being spent, and the day of Payment come, they then feel the great Danger which their short Pleasure hath purchased.

Whoso examineth all Humane Actions shall find, that in eschewing one Inconvenience, we presently incur another.

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As for Example, if we endeavor to make our Dominions Mighty, it becometh to have the same fully replenished with People, and well armed, and so being, they are not easily governed. On the other side, if our Country be not well Peopled, or Disarmed, then it is easily holden in Obedience; yet therewith so Weak, that it can neither increase the Bounds thereof, nor defend it self. It is therefore necessary, in all our Deliberations, to consider what Inconvenience is least, and choose that as the best; for to find all Perfect, Void and Secure of Suspect or Imperfection, is impossible.

A Prince being instantly required to take part with other Princes, the one being in Arms against the other, if he deny both, incurreth Suspicion of both, and may be thought to have Secret Intelligences with one or both of them; so as either of them shall account him an Enemy, and consequently he that proves Victorious will be revenged; and the other holding him suspected, will not acknowledge his Friendship.

It is the use of Men to presume much upon their own Merit, and seeing the Success of some others to be such, as without Cause or Desert, are aspired to Dignity thereby encouraged, they promised to themselves the like: Nevertheless being entred into the course of their Design, and finding many Crosses and Impeachments they do not a little repent their Overweening and Presumption, but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised Enterprize; neither can I think, that the Vertue or Sufficiency of any Man without the Favor of the Heavens, can advance him; for as the Poet saith, *Nec velle juvat, potiusve nocet, si fata repugnant.*

Whoso serveth a Prince far from his Presence, shall with great Difficulty content him. For if he commit any Error, it shall be aggravated: Besides that, the Instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly conceived, because the State of worldly things doth daily alter. Also to serve aloof, is a thing full of Danger and far from Reward; which Inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his Prince's Person.

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Let no Man that cometh to serve in Court, assure himself by his Wisdom to be advanced or eschew all Encounters. Neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to Fortune, but be perswaded that this worldly Life is like to a Voiage by Sea ; wherein albeit Art with the favor of the Wind may do much, yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the Haven appointed ; for daily Experience doth shew, that some strange Ships in the calmest Weather, are drowned or impeached by the way, when others much weaker and disarmed pass securely.

Among Men worthy of Commendations, those have merited best that first planted true Religion : next they that framed Kingdoms and Commonwealths ; the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged their Dominions ; lastly, Learned Men deserve Fame and Memory : and as every of these are worthy of Fame and Honor ; so ought they to be accompted Infamous that introduce Atheism, or the Subversion of Kingdoms, or are become Enemies to Learning and Virtue.

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Whosoever taketh in hand to govern a Multitude either by way of Liberty, or Principality, and cannot assure himself of those Persons that are Enimies to that Enterprise, doth frame a State of short Perseverance : yet true it is that such Princes be unfortunate, as for their own security are enforced to hold a course extraordinary, and have the Multitude their Enemy ; for he that hath few Foes may with small dishonor be assured ; but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured ; and the more Cruelty he useth, the weaker his Principality proveth.

In commending another Man, great Moderation is to be used ; for as contumely offendeth him against whom it is used ; so great praise, besides that it is uttered with danger to his Judgment that speaketh it, the same doth oftentimes offend him that heareth it. For Self-love which commonly possesseth Men, causes the Good or Evil we hear, to be measured with our own. And consequently every Man that is touched with like defects and defects, doth grow offended that his Commendation is not
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set forth, and feareth lest his Imperfection should be discovered.

It is often, or rather ever seen, that the force of Leagues not used in their first heat, becomes cold ; because Suspicion soon entereth, which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded, and may not without long time be rejoined.

The power of Ambition which possesseth the Minds of Men, is such, as rarely or never suffereth them to rest : The reason thereof is, That Nature hath framed in them a certain Disposition to desire all things, but not to obtain them ; so as our Desires being greater than our Power, therefore following Discontent and evil Satisfaction. Hereof also proceedeth the Variation of Fortune ; for some Men desiring to get, and others fearing to lose that they had gotten, do occasion one Man to injure another, and consequently Publick Wars do follow ; by means whereof, one Country is ruined, and another enlarged.

Princes of great Power, and chiefly those that are Inhabitants of the North, having many Children, were wont to

be much inclined to the Wars, as well to win unto themselves Honor, as also to get Possessions for their Sons; which manner of Proceedings did oftentimes remove such Disturbance as the Plurality of Brethren bringeth. These and other reasons induced Princes to attempt War against those Kingdoms, which in their opinion seemed easily conquered, or whereunto they can pretend little; for by colour thereof they may the rather justify their Proceedings.

When a Prince deferreth to answer an Ambassador, it proceedeth from some of these Respects; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth, or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded, or that he esteemeth not the Prince that doth demand, or that he disdaineth the Person by whom the demand is made, or else that he intendeth to hear from his own Ministers to be better resolved: Wherefore a discreet Negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these Reasons move the Prince where he is employed, to entertain him with delays, and make his dispatch accordingly. The

The sufficiency of good Counsellors consisteth in four things.

First, They ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their Affairs, directing all doings to publick Commodity.

Secondly, To be just in their Proceedings, giving to every one that which to him appertaineth.

Thirdly, To be stout, and void both of partial respects and fear.

And lastly, To be temperate and moderate in their Desires.

Whoso desireth to govern well and securely, it becometh him to have a vigilant Eye to the Proceedings of great Princes, and to consider seriously of their Designs: For it is matter of small difficulty to live in Peace with him who desireth our Amity, and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us.

The Intelligences that Princes study to attain, are procured by divers means: Some are brought by report, some vented by Conversation and Sounding, some by means of Espials; but the most sure and credibie Occurrents, are those which come from Ambassadors, chiefly

those that either for the Greatness of their Prince, or their own Virtue, be of most Reputation. For those Men conversing daily with great Personages, and pondering diligently their Manners, Words, Wisdom, and the order of each Man's Proceedings, yea, of the Prince himself, may with Commodities attain unto matters of great Importance sooner than they that are Writers of Rumors, or that take upon them to Conjecture of things to come.

Whensoever a People is induced to commit so great an Error, as to give Reputation to one only Man, to the end he should oppress all those great Men whom they hate, they thereby give him opportunity to become their Prince; and so being assisted with their Favor and Aid, he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the Nobility; and they being extirpated, he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the People, by whose help he aspires.

So many as are not consenting to the Tyranny, rest Enemies to the Person of the Tyrant, who can by no means gain the Love of all. For impossible it is,
that

that the Riches of any Tyrant should be so great, and the Honors he can give so many as may satisfy all. Hereof it cometh, that those Tyrants that are favored of the People, and disfavored of the Nobles, are most secure; because their Tyranny is supported with a greater Strength (having the Multitude their Friends) then is the Tyrant whom the Humor of the Nobles only hath advanced.

A dangerous thing it is in all Commonwealths by continual punishing, to hold the Minds of Subjects in Suspicion; for Men ever fearing their Ruine, will (without respect) determine to save themselves, and as Men desperate, attempt Innovation. All Capital Executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly, and as it were at one Instant, so to assure the Minds of Men from further Molestations.

The Intent of every Wise Prince that maketh War, either by Election or Ambition, is to gain and hold what is gotten: Also to use the matter so as thereby he may enrich himself, and
not

not impoverish his own People or Country.

He that enlargeth his Dominions, doth not always increase his Power; but he that increaseth in force as well as in Dominion, shall thereby grow great; otherwise he gained no more than is shortly to be lost, and consequently he ruineth himself: For who spends more in the War, than he gains by Victory, loseth both Labor and Cost.

Every Prince and Commonwealth must above all things take heed, that no Necessity how great soever, do persuade him to bring into his Dominion any Auxiliary Soldiers; because the hardest Conditions the Enemy can offer, are more easie than is such a Resolution.

A Prince sheweth his Ruine at hand, whensoever he beginneth to break the Laws and Customs, which are ancient and have been long time obeyed by the People of his Dominion.

That Prince which careth to keep himself secure from Conspiracy, ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great Favors, than them whom

whom he hath much injured : For these want Opportunities, the other do not ; and both their Desires are as one ; because the Appetite of Commanding, is always as much or more than the desire of Revenge.

Whensoever a Prince discovers a Conspiracy, he must well consider the quality thereof, measuring the Force of the Conspirators with his own ; and finding them many and mighty, the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled, until the Princes Power be prepared to oppose them ; otherwise he hazardeth his own security.

It hath been by long Experience found better to send one General to an Army, though he be of mean Sufficiency, than to give the same Authority to two or more Excellent Personages with equal Commission.

He that coveteth to be over-much loved, oftentimes becomes contemptible ; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared, is ever hated : And to hold the mean between them, cannot be exactly done, because Nature will not so permit.

Whoso

Whoso aspireth to any Dignity, must resolve himself to endure the Envy of Men, and never to be moved for any Offence conceived against him, though they that be offended, be his dear Friends: Neither shall he for the first affront or encounter, relinquish his hope; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of Fortune, shall after with Facility arrive where he designed.

In giving Council to a Prince or Commonwealth, and therefore desiring to eschew Danger and Offence, no other mean is to be taken than that the Counsellor shall without Passion or Perswasion pronounce his Opinion, and never to affirm any thing as a Resolution, but with modesty to defend that he speaketh; so as the Prince which follows his Advice, may seem to do it voluntarily, and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the Counsel.

A discreet Captain being in the Field against the Enemy, of whose Virtue he hath had no Proof, ought first by light Skirmishes to feel of what Virtue he is; and not to Enterprize any general
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Adventure, to the end that Terror or Fame should not daunt nor discourage his own Soldiers.

Albeit Fraud be in all Actions detested, yet is the same in Martial Enterprises commendable and glorious : For that Captain who compasseth his Designs by Wit or Stratagem, is no less commended than he that Vanquisheth the Enemy by Violence and Force.

In times of Extremity, when Resolution must be taken for the having or utter Loss of the State, then no regard is to be had of Justice or Injustice, Mercy or Cruelty, Honor or Ignominy, but rather setting aside all Respects, that course is to be followed which defended the Lives and Liberties of Men.

Whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter, let him think of that is past ; for the World hath ever been in a circular Revolution : Whatsoever is now, was heretofore, and things past or present are no other than such as shall be again : *Redit orbis in orbem.*

A Prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another, must if it be possible urge a sudden Answer, and lay before him that is moved, a Necessity to resolve presently, giving him to understand that denial or delays may breed a perilous and sudden Indignation.

There is nothing more difficult, doubtful and dangerous than to attempt Innovation: For he that taketh in hand an Enterprize of such quality, maketh all those his Enemies which lived well under the old Order, and findeth them cold Defenders that affect his Novelties, which coldness proceedeth chiefly of Incredulity; for Men are not easily induced to believe a new thing till Experience hath proved it to be good.

There is no Art nor Knowledge so seemly and necessary for a Prince as the Art Military with the Ordinances and Discipline thereof: For that is the only Skill required in him that commandeth, and such a Virtue as doth not only maintain them that are born Princes, but often advanceth private Men to that Dignity.

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The deep Impressions which old Injuries make in the Minds of great Men cannot with new Benefits be razed out ; it is also to be remembred that Injuries be done all together : For they offend the less, and will be forgotten the sooner ; but Benefits should by little and little be bestowed, so shall the Memory of them long continue.

A small pleasure or displeasure presently done, doth move more than a great good turn bestowed in times past ; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impression in the Minds of Men, than doth the Memory of things past, or expectation of things to come.

It is a matter of small difficulty to found the discontentment of other Men. For every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deserving of Friends, and likewise how much or how little Foes can do, if we have Patience to hear, which Patience is the beginning of all good Speed ; but he that delighteth to speak much, and hear little, shall ever inform others more than himself can learn.

Among other dangers which a Prince incurreth by being disarmed, the greatest

est is, that thereby he becometh contemptible ; for no comparison there is between Men armed and them that are disarmed : and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield Obedience to him that is disarmed, neither is it like that a Prince disarmed can be secure from his own Subjects armed.

A Prince Ignorant of Martial knowledge, among other Misfortunes cannot be esteemed or trusted of his own Soldiers ; it behoveth him therefore as well in time of Peace as War to exercise Arms, which may be done by two means ; the one by Action of Body, the other by Contemplation of Mind. The Body may be exercised in Hunting, Hawking, and such like Pastimes ; thereby to be made apt to endure Travel : his Mind likewise may be informed by Reading of Histories, and the Consideration of Actions performed by excellent Captains, observing the occasion of their Victories or Losses, to the end he may imitate the one, and eschew the other.

He that doth not as other Men do, but endeavoureth that which ought to be done, shall thereby rather incur

cur Peril than Preservation; for who-
so laboureth to be sincerely Perfect
and Good, shall necessarily Perish,
living among Men that are generally
Evil.

A Prince that useth Liberality to his
prejudice, ought not to regard the In-
famy of Miserable, because his Parsi-
mony will in time enable him to be Li-
beral, and so may declare himself to
be, having by Parsimony increased his
Power, and therefore without imposing
upon the People, may defend himself
from all such as will make War; so
shall he use Liberality to all them from
whom he taketh nothing, who are infi-
nite; and use Miserliness to those only
to whom he giveth, who are but few.

There is nothing that consumeth it
self like to Librality; for if it be long
used, it taketh away the means to con-
tinue it, and consequently doth make
Men poor and basely minded: Or
else to eschew Poverty, they shall be
forced to Extortion and become Odi-
ous.

It is better to incur the name of Co-
vetous (which is a Scandal without
hate)

hate) then with desire to be accounted Liberal, deserve the Infamy of Oppression (an Ignominy accompanied with hatred.)

A Prince ought to be slow in believing, and advised in proceeding; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared, but in all his Actions shew great Wisdom tempered with Curtesie; so shall not over much Confidence induce him to be careless, nor over much diffidence render him intolerable.

Whoso observeth, shall see that Man offended, less respect him whom they Love, than him whom they fear. For Love is maintained by a certain reciproque Obligation, which because Men are Evil, useth to be by every occasion of Profit broken. But Fear is continued by a certain dread of Punishment which never faileth.

A Prince that holdeth in the Field an Army wherein are great numbers of Soldiers, ought not to care though he be accounted Cruel: For without such an Opinion conceived, he cannot keep his Forces united, nor apt to attempt any Enterprize.

Men

Men for the most, do use rather to judge by their Eyes, than by their Hands, for every one may see, but few can certainly know. Every one seeth what thou seemest to be, but few can understand what thou art indeed; and these few dare not oppose themselves to the Opinion of many which have the Majesty of Estate to defend them. Also in the Actions of all Men, and chiefly Princes, from whom is no Appellation, the End is ever observed. *Machiavel.*

A Prince being forced to use the Condition of Beasts, must among them make Choice of the Fox and the Lyon; for the Lyon cannot take heed of Snares, and the Fox is easily overcome by the Wolves: It behoveth him therefore to be a Fox to discover the Snares, and a Lyon to terrifie the Wolves.

A Prince newly advanced cannot observe those Rules, which are the Cause that Men be accounted Good; he being many Times constrained for defence of his State to proceed contrary to Promise, contrary to Charity, and all Vertue; and consequently it behoveth him to have a Mind apt to Alteration, as the Wind and

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Variation of Fortune shall direct ; yet ought he not to abandon the Good, if so he can, but be ready to use what is Evil, if so he shall be enforced.

Every Prince ought to have two Ears, the one Intrinsick, in respect of Subjects ; the other Extrinsick, in respect of Forreign Potentates, from whom he may be defended with Good Arms, and Good Friends : Also Matters Intrinsick will ever stand well, so long as all things abroad rest firm.

A Prince that is favoured of the Multitude, need not to doubt Conspiracy ; but contrary wise, where the People is generally Discontented and Hateth the Prince, then may he reasonably doubt every Thing, and every Person ; for no Man is so Poor, that wanteth a Weapon wherewith to offend.

When any Occasion is presented to have that thou desirest, fail not to lay hold thereof ; for these Worldly Things do vary, and that so suddenly, as hard it is to assure our selves of any thing, unless the same be already in Hand : On the other Side, if any Trouble threaten thee, defer it so long as thou mayest ;
for

for Time may occasion some Accident to remove all Dangers.

The Prince that doubteth the Fidelity of his Subjects, must of Force build Fortresses; but he that feareth Foreign Force more than his own People, were better to leave them unbuilt. Howsoever it be, that Prince that desireth generally to be Respected and Esteemed, must perform some notable Enterprize, and give Testimony of great Vertue and Valour.

A Prince shall do well at all Times to be counselled so as no Man do presume to give Counsel but when the Prince doth ask it. It is also to be noted, That he who is not of himself Wise, cannot be well counselled of others, unless happily he yield to some Wise Men the Government of his whole Affairs. For Good Counsels from whomsoever they proceed, shall be thought to come from the Prince, and not the Wisdom of the Prince to proceed from the Counsel of others.

He that taketh Delight to be Employed in Publick Affairs, must by all Means endeavour to continue in such Services: For oft one Business dependeth on ano-

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ther, whereunto the *Florentine* Proverb may be applied, *Di cosa, nase cosa, & il tempole governa.*

Some Men have not only desired, but also compassed Honour and Profit; yet being in Possession of both, were not therewith so satisfied, as they hoped to be; which being believed, would happily extinguish the immeasurable Ambition wherewith many Men are possessed.

By Experience I have learned, That great Folly it is to account That Ours which we have not, or spend presently in Hope of future Gain. Therefore Merchants, during the Adventure of their Goods, do not increase Domestical Expences, but Fearing the Worst Assure what is in Hand.

For such Men as have gained unto themselves Reputation and are accounted vertuous, to maintain that Conceit, and eschew Envy, there is nothing better than a Life retired from daily Conversation, and chiefly of the Multitude. *Fugiat sapiens commercia pulgi:*

The End that moveth a Prince to make War, is to Enrich Himself, and Impoverish the Enemy: Neither is Victory desired

desired for other Purpose than thereby to become the more Mighty, and make the Enemy Weak : Consequently wheresoever thy Victory doth Impoverish thee, or thy Gain therein doth Weaken thee, it followeth that either thou pass or undergo that Mark whereunto the Intention of War was directed. And that Prince is by Victory Enriched, that can Oppress the Enemies Power, and become Master of his Goods and Possessions. And that Prince is by Victory Impoverished when the Enemy, notwithstanding he be Victored, can still Maintain himself, and the Spoils and Possessions are not taken to the Use of the Prince Victorious, but imparted unto his Soldiers. For then may he be thought in his own Losing Infortunate, and in Victory Unhappy ; for if he be Vanquished, then must he endure the Offence by Foes : And being Victorious shall be forced to abide the Wrong offered by Friends ; which as they be less Reasonable, so are they also less supportable, because he is still by Impositions forced to burthen the Subjects, whereof may be inferred. That the Prince, having in him any Generosity, cannot justly

rejoyce at that Victory which causeth the Subject to lament.

Who so desireth to obtain any thing, hopeth to compass his Desire, either by Intreaty, Presents, or Threatning ; for so shall he, to whom the Request is made, be moved either with Compassion, Profit, or Fear : Nevertheless, with Covetous and Cruel Men, and such as are in their Opinion Mighty, none of these can prevail. And consequently in vain do they labour, that go about by Suit to stir them to Pity, by Gifts to gain them, or by Threats to fear them.

Who so is persuaded that any Common-weal can continue disunited, doth greatly deceive himself : True it is, That some Divisions do maintain the Estate, but other do indamage the same. They which do Harm, are such as with Sects and Partakings be accompanied ; they which help without Sects and Partakings, be maintained. A wise Governour therefore, albeit he cannot so exactly foresee but some Enemies will arise in the State, yet may he take Order that no Factions may thereby grow. It is therefore to be noted, that the Citizens
of

of every Estate, may aspire to Reputation, either by Private or Publick Means. Reputation by Publick Means, is gained chiefly in the War, either by obtaining Victory in some Battle, or surprizing of some City; or else by performing some Ambassage diligently, prosperously: But Private Reputation is gotten by doing Favour to this or that Man, and protecting them from Magistrates; giving them Money, advancing them unworthily to Honour and Office; and by great Feasts, entertaining the Multitude; of which manner of Proceeding, Sects, Factions and Partakings do grow: And as Reputation thus gained is dangerous, so the other without Faction is profitable; because the same is founded on Common Welfare, and no private Profit: And albeit among Citizens of this sort, will oft arise great Hate, yet wanting Followers for their particular Profit, the State shall not be indangered, but rather strengthened; for every Man endeavouring to deserve well, will hold himself within the Bounds of Civil Life, and by Vertuous Merits labour to be advanced.

To persuade or dissuade particular Persons, is a Matter of no Difficulty : For if Words suffice not, yet Authority will prevail : But hard and perilous it is to remove a False Opinion conceived by a whole Multitude, for therein fair Speech and no Compulsion must be used.

The best means which wise Captains can use to make their Soldiers resolute, is to take from them all Hope ; which Resolution may also be increased with the Love of our Country and Confidence in the Captain : For Confidence groweth by the Valour of Men, and Discipline in former Victories, and Trust reposed in the Leader. The Love of our Country is Natural, but the Affection we bear to the Captain, proceedeth rather from his Vertue, than the Benefits he hath bestowed. Necessity also may do much, and chiefly that where no Choice is left, but either overcome by Arms or dye in Desperation.

There is nothing of so great Force to hold an Army united, as the Reputation of the Captain, which proceedeth only from his Vertue ; for neither Dignity nor Authority without Valour can work that Effect.

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The first Care that a Captain must have, is to hold his Soldiers well punished and paid ; for where Payment faileth, Punishment ought not to be inflicted : And consequently no Reason it is to punish him for Robbery, whom want of Pay enforceth to shift ; but where the Soldier is paid, and not punished (offending) then will he, without Respect, become Insolent towards his Captain ; whereof ensue Mutinies, Discord, and utter Ruin.

It is a Custom, very honourable, not to promise more than thou wilt assuredly perform : Yet true it is, that whosoever is denied (though justly) doth rest ill-contented ; for Men indeed are not governed by Reason : Otherwise it is for him that promiseth ; and so good Promises shall stand in stead of Performance : Besides that, he may find Excuse enough, because the most part of Men are so simple, that fair Words alone have Power to abuse them, chiefly when they proceed from a Person of Reputation and Authority. The best way, therefore, is not to promise precisely, but entertain the Suitors with Answers

swers general, and full of good Hope :
Yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind.

The greatest and most material Displeasures that use to arise between the Nobility and People, are caused by the diversity of Humours, the one labouring to command, the other endeavouring not to obey ; so as all Troubles and Disorders in every Common-weal, do thereof receive Nutriment.

The City which is maintained rather by Factions than Laws, so soon as one Faction is become strong, and without Opposition, the same of necessity must be divided in it self: for those particular Causes which were at the first taken, are not of Force enough to maintain it.

It is the nature of Men not to endure any Discommodity, unless Necessity do thereunto enforce them : Which may apparently be perceived by their Habitations ; for as the Fear of War draweth them to Places of Strength (for their Defence) so that Peril being past, they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit Countries of more Commodity and Profit.

It

It may seem strange, and no even Measure (yet approved by Experience) that where many offend, few are punished. Also petty Errors are severely corrected, but great and grievous Crimes be rewarded. In like manner, where many receive Wrong, few seek Revenge. For Injuries universal, are with more Patience than particular Offences endured.

All, or the greatest part of Men that have aspired to Riches or Power, have attained thereunto either by Force or Fraud: And without they have by Craft or Cruelty gained, to cover the foulness of their Fact, they call Purchase as a Name more honest. Howsoever he, that for want of Will or Wit useth not those Means, must rest in Servitude and Poverty. The Reason thereof is, That as Nature hath laid before Men the chief of all Fortunes, so she disposes them rather to Rapine than honest Industry, and more subject to bad than good Endeavours: Hereof it cometh, that one Man eateth another, and he that is weakest must always go to the worst.

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Where Necessity forceth, Boldness is reputed Wisdom, and in great Enterprises Peril is not to be made account of. For those Attempts that begin with Danger, always end with Honour, or Reward; also from one Peril there is no way to escape, but by entring into another.

A wise Man ought not to desire to inhabit that Country where Men have more Authority than Laws: For indeed that Country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own; not that, where with facility it may be taken away; and that Friends for fear to lose their own, are inforced to forsake them.

Some Magistrates either by over great Zeal or Ignorance take a Course of Rigour, which being for the present favoured, they are ever the more imployed, as Men meet to extirpate Inconveniences.

But thereby the Subjects are often drawn into Desperation, and consequently have recourse unto Arms, as their uttermost Refuge. In this case a Wise Prince for appeasing the People is forc'd

to disallow his Ministers, and sometimes also to inflict publick Punishment.

A Prince naturally suspicious, and having about him Persons inclined to Envy, is easily induced to mistrust those Men that have served him with most sufficiency: Which Danger they cannot eschew, because they who are worthiest Commendation are oftentimes envied by such Persons as have access unto the Prince.

Who so cannot endure both Envy and Hate, must refrain to enterprise great Matters: For great Honours being desired of many, it behoveth him that aspireth unto them, to be for his Dignity envied, and for his Authority hated; which Authority, albeit the same be well used, yet they who hate or envy (persuading themselves it might be better handled) endeavour to oppress that Power, as fearing it will be worse.

Among other things which worketh the Inconveniences of Common weals, Ambition and Desperation are chief; of both, Desperation is worst: For Ambition may attend Occasion, Desperation will not, as that cannot endure Delays.

Historians

Historians desiring to write the Actions of Men, ought to set down the simple Truth, and not say any thing for Love or Hatred: Also to chuse such an Opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will, and write what they think, which is a rare Happiness of the Time.

In commending or disallowing the Actions of Men, it is a course very requisite to consider the Beginning, the Proceeding, and End: So shall we see the Reasons and Causes of things, and not their bare Events only; which for the most part are governed by Fortune.

It is a matter of much Necessity, that every Man, and chiefly a Prince should in his first Actions, give some Testimony of Vertue; for falling at first into obloquie, do he well or ill, all is ill-taken.

The Custom of the Common People is to judge rather by their Eyes than by their Ears: Which is the cause they allow more of external Shew than inward Vertue: And true it is, where excellency of Mind, and Beauty of Body concur, the Commendation due to such a Person is far the greater.

Gratior

Gratior est pulchro veniens e corpore virtus.

A Prince or great Personage that constantly endureth Adversity, deserveth great Praise: Yet greater Commendation is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his Happiness. For Miseries are oft born with Patience, but Felicity corrupteth.

To be descended of Princes, or great Personages, is a matter of meer Fortune, and so to be esteemed: But Adoption proceedeth from the Judgment of Men, therefore seemeth incorrupt, and seldom abused.

It hath been long observed, and is a Rule which rarely faileth, that he shall be ever suspected of the Prince in possession, whom Men account worthy to be a Prince in Reversion.

It hath been a Use very ancient to give Credit to Astrologers, and other such Persons, who by their Star-Learning or Blind Divination, take upon them to tell of things to come. The Reason thereof is, That the most part of Men believe that soonest which they least understand; and if they see the Event of a Prediction, though

though it happeneth by meer Chance to fall out according to that was premised, thereupon they litle so firm an Impression, as albeit many other fail, yet the good Concept of their Cunning cannot be removed.

.. Liberality is a Vertue which gaineth Love, but much are they deceived whom Riot in lieu thereof abuseth. To cast away and consume is soon learned, but to give in good Order few have the Skill.

In Time of sudden Mutiny, Conspiracy, and Offence of People, the wisest Resolution is not to oppose Force to prevent Fury, but rather give Space for the Bad to amend, and the Good to consent: For Treasons prevail on the sudden, but good Council gathers Forces by Leisure.

Mature Deliberation ought ever to be used; but when Arms are to determine, speedy Execution is the best: Because no Delay in that Enterprise is fit which cannot be commended before it be ended.

Who

Who so is pleased to observe the proceedings of Men in Authority, shall observe that some of them hold a plain course without respect ; others projecting for time to come, do forecast how to hold their present good fortune or at least to escape danger : For they mistrusting present Prosperity and fearing a change, prepare beforehand some private Friends to oppose against publick hatred : Whereof may be inferred, that no care is taken of Innocency, but every one studieth how to pass without punishment.

In Captains and all Military Commanders, three things are required, Vertue, Discipline, and Authority ; but in private Soldiers Obedience and Courage only sufficeth ; for by due obeying, and no curious scanning the Leaders directions are maintained ; and the Army in danger is alwaies most valiant, which before the danger is most quiet. Let the Soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded. To advise and direct must be the Captains care.

It is a matter of no great moment, yet always worthy the noting, that any

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exterior Behaviour, or Garment presenting Pride or Greatness, chiefly in Persons lately advanced, though no Man be thereby interess'd or injured, doth move in others a certain offence: For the nature of Man is such, as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious Eye, and wisheth a moderation of Fortune no where so much as in those we have known inequal degree with our selves.

In all Enterprises of War (if present necessity doth not otherwise require) Leisure and Deliberation ought to be used; for often it sufficeth in lieu of Wisdom, to take the advantage of other Mens folly.

All Men that are to consider of great Actions, ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the Commonweal, honourable to themselves, and easie to be effected; or at least not greatly difficult. Also he that perswadeth, is to be examined whether besides bare Words and Counsel, he will join his own Peril; and if Fortune favour the attempt, to whom the principal Glory shall redound.

The

The Perils which accompany private Enterprises, are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to Principality. For in private attempts a Man may pause or proceed as he will: But to him that aspires to Empire there remains no middle course, but either by Victory to triumph as a Prince; or being vanquished to endure death as a Traytor.

Let no Man in his Prosperity, give much credit to common Applause or Service, assured by any of whom in meaner Fortune he hath had no experience; for the base People are learned in no Lesson, only without difference of Truth or Falshood to flatter Men in Authority, and with Shouts and Words of great rejoycing make shew of great Affection.

As overmuch haste is dangerous, so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantageous; for albeit consultation ought to forego action, yet to Dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side, or take a middle course (which in cases of doubt and danger is worst) was ever accompted great discreti-
on.

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There is no course more comely, nor any resolution so well becoming a wise Man, having made proof of his own Vertue (and finding in Age no Fortune due to such effect) as to retire himself from the Court and Company; for so shall he shun the Inconveniences of Contempt and the Discommodity of Travel (*Jucunda senectuti otia*) yet true it is, that whoso hath lived a Prince or governed as a publick Person, cannot expect security in a private Estate.

Whensoever danger draweth near, and terror is at hand, all Men look about, but none willingly adventure: For in such Cases every Man will give Council, but few will take part of the peril.

In Common-wealths where Sects or Partialities be, the Leader of any side is able to kindle Civil War; yet is he unable to moderate the Victory: For to stir up dissensions and troubles, the worst Man most commonly bears the stroke; but peace and quietness are not established but by Men of rare Gifts and excellent Vertue.

It may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and Christian profession, that Men are far more mindful of Injuries done unto them, than of benefits received by them. The reason thereof is, that Thankfulness is accompted a burden, but Revenge is sweet, and reckoned a great gain.

Of reconciled Foes, and such as know that our harms were caused by their means, we oft-times expect favour, as perswaded that new Friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure: But the matter doth seldom so fall out; for the quality of Man's nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt, and love them whom he hath made beholding. *Quos laeserunt oderunt.* Tac.

To common Persons and such as are ignorant in Matters of State, every Taxation and Imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous; yet the wiser sort know, that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm People in Peace, and Peace cannot be maintained without Arms, nor Arms without Pay, nor Pay without Impositions.

As fortunate Folk are envied, so are the poor contemned; which Rule reacheth also to Princes: The one lives in Plenty with War, the other in Poverty with Peace. For seldom is it seen, that those People are assaulted where nothing is to be gained, and whose base Beings afford no other spoils than Blood and Beggery.

Wise men have observed that in matter of State, and the managing thereof, three Things are especially to be looked unto: The first is, Occasion; the second, the Intentions of other Men; the third, our own Affection. For there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as Occasion, nothing so difficult as to judge what an other Man intendeth; nor any thing more nocent than our own immoderate desires.

It hath been ever a course observed by wise Princes, but much more by *Aristocracies* and *Popular States*, against Force and Fury of the Multitude, to defend themselves with Silver and Gold.

How much more it importeth all Princes to lead a virtuous Life, and give daily

daily example of Piety and Justice, appears apparently in the Proceedings of the *Roman* Bishops; who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first, became greatly honoured; but afterwards they became contemptible: For the Reverence which Men did bear to the sanctity of their Lives failing, it was impossible of so contrary Manners and Examples to look for like effects.

The success of the War chiefly dependeth on the Reputation of the Prince, which declining, the vertue also of the Soldiers faileth: Likewise the fidelity of the People decayeth, and their Mony to maintain the War, ceaseth; contrarywise, the Courage of the Enemy is increased, they that stood doubtful become resolved, and every difficulty augmenteth.

The Authority which Princes give, is chiefly in respect of Wisdom and Valour: Yet true it is, that for the most part they account them the wisest Men that can best accommodate themselves to their Humour.

The greatest Distress and Difficulty which can come to any Army, doth

proceed of these Causes: Want of Money, scarcity of Victuals, hatred of People, discord of Captains, disobedience of Soldiers, and their flying to the Enemy, either of necessity or free-will.

A Prince or great Magistrate having long maintained the reputation of Wisdom and Vertue, must take heed that no rash or dangerous Resolution do taint the Honourable Fame of his former Life: For to be transported with Anger against his own Profit, is lightness; and to esteem small dangers more than great, is want of Judgment.

A Prince or Person of great Estate, must be wary not to inure the conceit of double dealing: For little Sincerity and Trust is looked in his Actions, of whom there is an opinion of Craft and Falshood conceived.

Experience hath always proved, that whatsoever the most part of men desire, rarely cometh to pass: The reason hereof is, that the effects of Human Actions commonly depend on the will of a few; and their Intentions ever differing from the greater number, the end
and

and success cannot be other than as pleaseth the few that are to direct them.

There is nothing more dangerous than to enterprize a War, or other Actions of Importance upon popular persuasion ; for such expectations are vain, and such designs fallible : Also the Fury of the Multitude is great, when danger is little or far off ; but Perils growing great and near, their Courage quaieth, as they whose Passions have no Rule or Measure.

It is strange to see how apt Men are to doubt displeasure threatned by Enemies, chiefly when they draw near ; for the People do naturally over-much fear Dangers at hand, and esteem less than is fit of things present : Also to make small account of those that are far from them, because divers Remedies may be hoped as well by time, as other accidents.

The offensive Words or Answers of Indignation, proceeding from great Princes, ought never to admit displeasure into the Minds of them against whom they are spoken : For having by
Speech

Speech uttered a great part of Choler, the edge of their Deeds becomes the calmer, and more easily appeased : Such is the condition of noble and generous Spirits:

To judge right of other Mens merit, seems of great difficulty ; for time and tryal is thereto required : Also it is not easie to answer the expectation of Men, but oft-times inconsiderate, and not measured in due proportion.

It is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of Affairs and Vacations : For as it fitteth well a Prince or Person of Dignity in times of Audience and Judgment, to be grave, heedful, and austere : So those Offices performed, all shew of Authority and sad looks ought to be set apart ; for by that means, neither courteous Behaviour shall detract from the Reverence due to his place, nor severity diminish the Love which to his Behaviour appertaineth.

Magistrates must look into all things, but not exact all things to rigor. Light Faults may be pardoned, but great Offences severely corrected ; yet not always

ways proceeding to punishing, but oft contented with Repentance. To be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a Magistrate, shewing himself sower to the bad, and sweeter to the good ; framing both Countenance and Condition according to the Merit of Men, and be persuaded that it is more honest to offend, than to hate.

Soldiers must be encouraged in all Fortunes to stand resolved, and not to be daunted with any passed misadvantage ; ever attending a Time and Opportunity of Revenge ; which commonly cometh to pass where Mens Minds are united : For common Danger must be repelled with Union and Concord.

Among other Reasons wherewith Soldiers are encouraged, Necessity and Distress doth oft inforce them : For as Men of Vertue perform the Actions of Arms for Honour, so the Coward must do them for his Security.

All Enterprises attempted by Arms, are Honourable ; but those that are done in Countries remote, are more praiseable : For the less they be in Knowledge, the greater is the Glory to Achieve them.

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To be truly and faithfully loved, is a thing greatly to be desired; for Terror and Fear are weak Works of Affection: For they being taken away, he that ceaseth to fear, will soon begin to hate; and as they that by Force are kept under, obey with ill Will; so they that govern without Line justly, rule against Right.

Some Men either deserving to be accounted of excellent Wisdom, or singular in that Skill whereof they make Profession, do ordinarily love the Proceedings of others; taking that Advantage of their ill Success: Yet sure it is, that Disaster and unhappy Event of some Actions, proceed not of Disorder, nor Human Imperfection, but from a certain Fatal Fury, which neither Counsel nor Constancy of Men can withstand.

It is a matter of much difficulty, or rather impossible for any Prince to maintain the Law, Civil or Military, without Severity: For where Men hope to be easily pardoned, there are they apt to offend. Contrarily, where Mens Actions are precisely fitted, there do they live in over-

over-great Aw, and Hatred doth always accompany such Severity. The best course therefore is to punish Offences severely, and reward vertuous Merits liberally; so shall Fear be converted to reverend Respect, and none have cause to complain: For as it lies in each Man's Power to shun offending, so is it in their Power also to deserve well, and merit Reward.

Whosoever, after mature deliberation, hath resolved what Course to hold in the Action he hath in hand, must not after repent, or fear any Difficulty: For such Thoughts would break the Vigour of the Mind, and impeach the Proceedings of that which was resolved. And albeit some Differences do happily arise, yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater Impediments.

Young Men for the warmth of their Blood, and for not having before-time been deceived by Fortune, more willingly enterprise Actions rather honourable than severe. But Old Men as well for that their Heat is cooled, as also for having attempted many things in vain,
make

make choice of Enterprises severe, rather than those that are followed with Fame and Glory.

The greatness of one Prince is nothing else but the Ruin and Distress of another: Likewise his Strength is the Weakness and Oppression of others.

Some Conquests are of such Quality, as albeit a victorious Captain merit triumphal Honour; yet a modest refusal becomes his greater Glory.

The Dignity of Magistrates is not assured without Arms; for when Obedience faileth, no other means is left to continue a People united.

As willing Obedience in Subjects is the Prince's Strength, so is the same their own Security: For as by the Princes Authority the People are governed, so by their Consent he is maintained.

Three things Men covet with immoderate Desire, Lands, Riches, and Honours; but as seldom they compass their full Content, so are they for the most part to endure a Destiny far other than they wished.

Strange it is, yet by Experience proved true, That in Time of Danger, Fortune

tune (or rather Destiny) so much amazeth the Judgment of Wise Men, as seldom they conceive what Resolution is best to be taken.

No great Free-City can long continue quiet, unless the same be us'd to foreign Assaults: For wanting Foes without, some inward Enmity will arise, not unlike to strange Bodies of Men, which being secure from external Injury, are nevertheless by their own Poise oppressed.

As every Pilot of ordinary Skill knoweth in calm and quiet Seas to direct the Course of his Ship; so every Governor of Capacity doth understand how the Affairs of State are in peaceable Times to be handled: But when Tempests are, and Subjects bent to Sedition; the one requires an excellent Sailer, the other the Aid of some excellent Wisdom.

It oft happens, that Publick Duty is opposite to private Friendship; so as we are either forced to omit the Offices due to our Country, or draw our dearest Friends into Danger: In which case we are to prefer publick Respect, before particular Obligation.

The

The nature of base People is such, as either they obey slavishly, or command insolently: For Liberty being the Mark whereat they aim, is by them of that Quality, neither moderately desired nor discreetly continued; and always there are some seditious Leaders to be found, who of Disorder are inclined to kindle the Ire and Offence of Ignorant People. *Dux rebus motis, facile invenitur.* Salust.

Experience hath oft proved, That Men in best Fortune, and such as esteem themselves most secure, even then fall soonest into Disadventure, because those Dangers unfeared be as it were contemned, and not regarded.

To enter needless Dangers, was ever accounted Madness; yet in Times of extream Peril and apparent Distress, Bold and Hazardous Attempts are greatest Security.

The divers Adventures which happen to Men, may well inform, That much better it is, chiefly in Arms, to be governed by Reason than by Fortune.

A certain Peace is ever accounted better Security than Victory hoped or expected

pected. *Melior tutiorque certa pax quam sperata victoria.* Liv.

If to our Prosperity God were pleased to add the Grace of Wisdom, we should thereby judge not only of what is past, but also of all that can succeed hereafter.

Rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings, unless first we have felt the deceits of Fortune. Discord or Dissention in any State or City, offers opportunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will: For the humor of Sects and Partialities is such, as the weaker Faction doth ever chuse rather to call for aid of Strangers, than yield to the Dominion of an adverse Party.

Ancient Customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away: Fortune which altereth all things, will by little and little wear them out of use.

To be oft in sight, and converse much with men, breedeth a kinde of Satiety: therefore it behoveth persons of great Estate and Authority to be retired, lest over-much familiarity should detract from the reverence due to honorable Estate.

The natures of men not content to live according to their Fortune and Birth, are of all others most prone to Envy; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them.

Great heed is to be taken, that no Citizen or Subject, be suffered to aspire to such greatness, as cannot be forced to obey the Laws; and no order there is of more necessity, than that every man of what quality soever, may be without respect accused and judged.

For conservation of particular Greatness and Dignity, there is nothing more noble and glorious, than to have felt the force of every Fortune.

It is the quality of wise men only, to know how to use Prosperity, and never to trust too much to the favors of present Happiness. A man well advised in his Prosperity, beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent; nor must he believe in his own present felicity, for the Day knows not what the Night bringeth: He only is to be reputed a man, whose mind cannot be puffed up by prosperity, nor de-

dejected by any adverse Fortune.

Men of Cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent Speeches, but wise men laugh them to scorn.

The way whereby a Prince eschues the hate of Subjects, is, not to take from them their Lands or Goods; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted, unless the same be accompanied with Confiscation (which a Prince is rarely forced to use) it seldom causeth him to become odious.

A Rule most cerain it is that he who commands any thing unpleasing, must by severe means cause it to be observed; and who desireth to be obeyed, must know how to command: And he only knows how to command, that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey; wherein finding a proportion, then he may boldly proceed, otherwise forbear.

In Actions of difficulty great courage is to be used, and who so compasseth any thing by violence, cannot maintain it by mildness, nor command by affability: He therefore that is of nature soft, should do best to refrain all extraordinary com-

mands, and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his mild spirit; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince or his Magistrates, but to the Laws and Ordinances of State.

When Necessity presseth, desperation is deemed Wisdom, and generous Minds do not account of danger, because those Attempts which begin with Peril, do for the most part end with Glory.

He that endeavours to be good among many that are evil, or will uphold that which those labour to pull down of Force, worketh his own undoing. All Common-wealths alter from order to disorder, from disorder to order again; for Nature having made all worldly Things variable, so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height, they must descend; so from good they fall back to evil; and from evil they return to good. War begets Quiet, Quiet Idleness, Idleness Disorder, Disorder Ruin; likewise Ruin Order, Order Vertue, Vertue Glory and good Fortune.

Wise

WiseMen have observed thatArms were before Learning, and Captains before Philosophers ; for good and well regulated Armies having gained Victory, established Rest and Security, whereof the Study of Letters and Liberal Sciences ensued.

That Country deserveth to be loved of all Men, which loves all Men indifferently, and not that Country which respecting the best part, advanceth a few : No Man therefore is to be blamed, if for such cause he desire rather to abandon than embrace his Country.

Common-wealths are Bodies mixt, yet have they of Bodies simple some resemblance : And as in these, many Infirmities grow, which without violent Medicines cannot be cured ; so in the other many Mischiefs arise, which a good and godly Patient should offend to leave uncured, though therein he use both force and fire.

Those Wars be most just which are most necessary ; and those Arms are most merciful where no hope of help remains but in them only.

In Actions which promise either publick Glory, or private Honour, Men may be reasonably persuaded to adventure life and living, because great hope there is to die with Reputation, or live to recover that Peace which War hath consumed : But where Men are no less oppressed by insolency of Commanders, than by insolency of Foes, there is the Calamity doubled, and of two evils the danger of War seemeth least ; for that hath end, the other is infinite.

Who so persuades himself to be no less esteemed in evil than good Fortune, is deceived : For promises made, during distress, are rarely performed, unless the same necessity continue.

The intent of every Prince, or other State that makes War, is to enrich himself, and impoverish the Enemy : Neither is Victory for other occasions sought, nor the possessions of the Enemy to other end desir'd, than to make themselves mighty, and their Enemy weak. It follows then, that so oft as the Victory impoverishes them, or the gains weaken them, either they pass or come short of that Mark whereat the War was aimed.

Ancient

Ancient and well-governed Commonwealths were wont by their Conquests to fill the Treasuries with Gold and Silver, to give reward to Soldiers, to spare the People from Tributes, to make Triumphs and Publick Feasts: But in later times the Wars have used, first, to consume the Treasure, and after impoverish the People without assuring them from their Enemies.

A Prince or State that leaves promises unperformed, by reason of unexpected Impediments, and for no ill intent, ought not to be blamed: Neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why Friends should abandon their Confederates.

Where Magistrates govern justly, Subjects obey dutifully; where private Persons grow rich, and Princes enlarge their Empire; there is the Commonwealth blessed, and the People fortunate.

C H A P. XXVI.

Maxims of State, or Prudential Grounds and Polemical Precepts, concerning all Estates, and Forms of Policy in Times of Peace or War, &c. confirmed by Select Narrations and Historical Parallels.

ALL Cities and Towns of State are builded either by People dwelling in or about the Place where they are builded, or else they are made by Strangers: Of the first are *Athens* and *Venice*, of the other *Alexandria* and *Florence*.

The Fortune of every City builded, and Vertue of the Builder, appeareth by Choice of the Place, and Quality of Laws: For as fertile Places occasion Men to be slothful, unless by good Laws they be forced to labour, so Barrenness

renness compels them to Industry ; which Reason induceth Wise Men to plant Habitations in either : Examples of the first are *Ferrara* and *Rome*, of the second *Ragusa* and *Genoa*.

All Laws whereby Commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent Man, and at an instant ; or else they were ordained at sundry Times, according to such Accidents as besel. *Example*, The Laws of *Sparta* made at the beginning by *Lycurgus*, the Laws of *Rome* at sundry Times.

The Government of every City in Time becomes corrupt ; Principality changeth into Tyranny : The Optimacy is made the Government of the People ; and the Popular Estate turns to licentious Disorder ; which Instability or Alteration moved some Law-makers to take Order that in the Government of their City there should be a Mixture of all three, and was the Cause that the Policy of *Sparta* continued 800 Years , when the Popular State of *Athens* endured not one hundred. *Example*, The Laws of *Sparta* made by *Lycurgus*, and the Laws of *Athens* by *Solon*.

Whoso

Whoſo taketh in hand to frame any State or Government, ought to preſuppoſe that all Men are Evil, and at occaſions will ſhew themſelves ſo to be. *Example,* The Envy of the People of *Rome* to the Nobles, and their Inſolency towards them appeared not ſo long as the Kings governed; but the *Tarquins* being Banished, Opportunity was thereby offered, that the Malice of the one and the other became diſcovered.

The divers Honours of the Nobility and People, the one deſiring to command, the other not to obey, are the Cauſe of continual Troubles, unleſs ſome third Mean there be of more Authority than either, to bridle the Force of both. *Example,* The Kings in *Rome* expelled; forthwith aroſe much Mutiny, and could not be ſuppreſs'd till the *Tribum Plebis* were created; whoſe Authority wrought the ſame effect which the Kings had done. Some States endeavour to enlarge their Dominions, and ſome others labor only to maintain that Eſtate they antiently poſſeſſed. Example of the firſt was the City of *Rome*, of the ſecond *Sparta*.

All

All States desiring to live at Liberty, think fit that every Man should be permitted to accuse any Citizen that offendeth, which manner of proceeding works two excellent Effects: First, That the People should not dare for Fear of accusing to attempt ought against the State; or if they do, they shall be presently and without Respect punished. Secondly, by Liberty of accusing, every Man hath Means to utter the Offence wherewith he can charge others, which he could not; unless it were lawful to take such an ordinary Course, and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary, particular Revenge, or calling in Foreign Forces. *Example, Coriolanus and Appius, Claudius at Rome, Lucanncve at Chinfi, Francisco Valeri in Florence.*

As Accusations are in every State necessary, so Slanders are dangerous, and worthy of Punishment; the Difference betwixt Accusations and Slanders, is, that the one is publicly performed before Magistrates, with good Proofs and Witnesses to maintain the Truth of the Accusation; but Slanders are as well publicly performed as dispersed in secret,
and

and Places of Repair, without Witness and Justification, so as every Man may be slandered, but few are orderly accused. *Example, Appius Claudius* accused by *L. Virginus*; *Furius Camillus*, slandered by *Manlius Capitolinus*.

The only means to suppress Slander is, to give Authority to some Persons of Repute, to compel every Slanderer to become an Accuser; and if the Accusation prove true, then to reward the Accuser, or at least not to punish him. *Example, Manlius* the Slanderer of *Camillus* for his untrue Information punished.

A Rule most certain and assured it is, That every Kingdom and State at the first well framed, or after well informed, doth take the Perfection thereof from the Wisdom of some excellent Man, who ought not to be blind though in a Matter of great Moment he happily useth some extraordinary Violence or Proceedings; for he that employeth Force to mend and not to mar, deserves Commendation. *Example, Romulus, Lycurgus, Cleomenes.*

There lives no Man so simple or wise, so wicked or well-disposed, but prefers those

those Persons that are praisable before those that are blameable : Notwithstanding for that well-near all Men are beguil'd in discerning what indeed is Good, deeming that Honourable which in Truth is otherwise ; they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a Course which merits rather Infamy than Commendation. *Example*, Every Man wisheth himself *Timoleon*, or *Agessilaus*, rather than *Dionysius* or *Phalaris* ; rather a *Titus* or *Trajan*, than *Caligula* or *Vitellius*.

Who reads Histories treating of great Actions shall perceive that good Princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the Love of the People, and Fidelity of Counsellors, than were they that entertained many Legions and Men of War. *Example*, Of all those Emperours which reigned after *Cesar* until *Maximinus*, the greatest number were for their Vices taken and slain, only *Galba* and *Pertinax* excepted, who were good Emperours.

A Prince of great Knowledge both in Arms and Wisdom, so firmly setteth the Foundation of Government, as albeit his Successor

Successor be of the less Vertue, yet may he be maintained even by the Memory of his Predecessor : But if it happen that the third Prince prove not more like the first than the second, then all that is past goeth to Ruine. *Example*, The Martial Valour of *Romulus* was the cause that *Numa* might govern safely in Peace : Which *Tullus* could not have done, had he been unlike to *Romulus* ; nor should *Bajazet* Emperour of *Turky* have enjoyed the State of his Father *Mahomet*, and left the same to his Posterity, if *Selim* his Son had not been more like to his Grand-father than to *Bajazet* his Father.

The Succession of two excellent Princes, chiefly if they be of long life, works wondrous Effects : The like is seen in Optimacies and Popular States, where the Governours successively elected be Men of great Vertue and Understanding. *Example*, The first appeared in *Philip* of *Macedon*, and *Alexander* his Son, the second in the Consuls of *Rome*.

In every State, where Soldiers are not, the Fault thereof proceeds from the Governours. Wise Princes were therefore
wont

wont even in Times of Peace to cause Warlike Exercifes to be used ; for without them the moft Warlike Nations become not only Ignorant in Martial Knowledge, but alfo effeminate. Example, *Pelopidas & Epaminondas* in *Thebes*, and King *Tullus* in *Rome* as well in Peaceable as Troublefome Times ufed the exercife of Arms.

No Prince or State well advifed, hazards his whole Eftate upon the Valour of fome few Perfons, nor ought to Strength of ftrait Places, where the Enemy is to pafs. Example, *Tully* King of *Rome*, and *Metius* King of *Alba*, condefcended that three of their Nobility for either fide, chofen fhould enter Combate, and that Nation which was Victorious fhould command the other. *Francis* the French King going to recover *Lombardy*, was by the *Switzers* attended into two or three Places in the Mountains, hoping there to repulfè him, but the King taking another way, paffed fecurely and prevailed.

Every State well governed doth reward Men of good Merit, and punifh all Offenders ; and if any Perfon of good Defert fhall wilfully be a Delinquent ,
the

the same Man ought notwithstanding his former service, be punisht. *Example,* The same *Horatio* that in Combat gained the Victory against the *Albani*, having insolently slain his own Sister, was notwithstanding his egregious Act and the fresh memory thereof, called into trial of his life, and with great difficulty obtained Pardon: And *Manlius* who had with great Glory saved the Capitol, for moving Sedition in *Rome*, was after from the same cast down headlong.

Every wise Man having performed any great service to his Prince or Country, ought to be content with such recompence as it shall please the Prince or Country to bestow: Measuring the same according to the Power of the giver, and not the merit of him that receiveth. *Example,* *Horatius Cocles* for having lost his Hand in defence of the Bridge of *Rome*, and *Mutius Scaevola* suffering his Hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill King *Porfenna*, were rewarded with a small Portion of Land; and *Manlius* that defended the Capitol from the *Galleys*, had no greater reward than a little measure of Meal.

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Ingratitude is a Vice so natural and common, as not only private Persons, but Princes and States also either through Covetousness or Suspicion are therewith infected. *Example, Vespasian* proclaimed Emperor, was chiefly aided by *Antonius Primus*, and by his help prevailed against *Vitellius*, in Reward of which Service *Vespasian* removed him from the Command of his Army, and gave that honour to *Mutianus*. *Consalvo Ferranoe* having taken the Kingdom of *Naples* from the *French*, was first removed from his Command of the Castles and Soldiers, and in the end brought into *Spain*, where in disgrace he ended his Life. *Collatinus Tarquinius* who with the aid of *Brutus* suppressed the *Tarquins* of *Rome*, and with him *Pub. Valerius* were banish'd for no other cause but for being of the name of *Tarquin*, the other because he built a House upon Mount *Cælio*.

All Errors that great Captains commit, are either wilful or ignorant, towards the one and the other of which Offenders to use greater lenity than the quality of their Offences deserves, seem-

eth necessary : For Men of Honour suffer nought by the Infamy which evil Service doth bring. It is also to be considered that a great Captain being cumbered with many cares, cannot proceed in his Actions couragiously, if he stand in daily doubt to be punish'd for every error that hapneth. Example, *Sergius* and *Virginus* were before *Veio*, the one part of the Army on the one side of the City, the other not far from the place. *Sergius* being assaulted by the *Falisci* was not aided by *Virginus*, neither would he require his help, such was the envy the one bare to the other ; and consequently their Offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment. Likewise when *Varro* by his Ignorance, received an overthrow by *Hannibal* at *Canna*, he was nevertheless pardoned and honourably welcomed home by the whole Senate.

Whensoever an Inconvenience ariseth within or without the State, it seems a Resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof, than to seek by sudden violence to suppress it. Example, *Cosmo de Medices* having gained extraordinary

dinary Reputation in *Florence*, the Citizens imagined, that to suffer the same to increase was dangerous, and therefore they Banished him : Which extream Proceeding, so offended the Friends of *Cosme*, being the stronger, as they forced the Citizens to revoke him, and make him Prince of that City. The like hapned in *Rome*, where *Cesar* for his Vertue, much admired and followed, became afterwards to be feared ; and they that feared, not considering their force to be inferior to the power of *Cesar*, endeavouring to oppress him, were the occasion of his greater Glory.

In every Republick, an excessive Authority given to one or two Persons for long time, proveth dangerous, chiefly when the same is not restrained. *Example*, The Dictatorship given to *Cesar* for life, was an occasion to oppress the Liberties of the *Romans*. The same effect was before that time like to follow the *Decemvirate*, by suffering *Appianus Claudius* to prolong the time of his Dignity.

The Ambition of Men is such, as rarely they will obey when formerly they

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have commanded ; neither do they willingly accept of mean Office, having before sat in higher place : Yet the Citizens of well-governed States, did not refuse as well to obey as command. *Example*, The Victory the *Romans* obtained against the *Veienti*, *Q. Fabius* was slain, having the year before been Consul : Nevertheless he then served in meaner place under *C. Manilius*, and *M. Fabius* his own Brother then Consul.

There is nothing more strange, yet by experience proved true, That Men in adverse Fortune be much grieved, and in Prosperity also discontented ; which is the reason, that not being forced to fight for necessity, they will nevertheless contend for Ambition ; and that Humour doth as well possess those that live aloft, as others whom Fortune holdeth down. *Example*, The People of *Rome* having by the Authority of the *Tribunes* obtained to make themselves secure from oppression of the Nobility, forthwith required, That the Honour and Office of State might be also imparted unto them. The like Ambition moved them to have
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their part of Lands by force of *Lex Agaria*, which was at last the overthrow of the *Roman Liberty*.

It seemeth that People displeased with some Innovations hapned in the State, do sometime without just Reasons complain of those that govern: Not unlike to a sick Man, who deemeth that the Physician, not the Fever, is the cause of his Grief. *Example*, The People of *Rome* were persuaded that the Ambition of Consuls was the cause of continual War, therefore required that no more Consuls should be; yet they were content that certain *Tribunes* should command with like Authority; so was nothing altered in the Government, but the Governors Title, which alone did content them.

Nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of Man so much, or so soon as the immoderate desire of Honour; in so much as Men of honest Minds and virtuous Inclinations are sometimes by Ambition, drawn to abuse that Goodness whereunto they are inclined. *Example*, *Appius Claudius* having lived long an Enemy to the Multitude, hoping by their aid to continue his Authority of

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the *Decemviri* in Rome, became their Friend, and disfavoured the Factions of great Men. Likewise *Q. Fabius* a Man of singular vertue, being also called to that dignity by *Appius's* self, adulterated his nature and became like unto him.

Seldom or never is any People discontented without just cause ; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth, many times for want of some fit Man to pronounce their grief, they stand silent. *Example*, The *Romans* at the death of *Virginia*, were gathered together armed upon Mount *Sacro*, and being asked by the Senate, for what cause they so did ? No Answer was made ; until *Virginio* Father of the *Virgin* had procured, that twenty of the Tribunes might be made to be as Head of the People, and confer with the Senate.

A great Folly or rather meer Madnes it seemeth to desire any thing, and tell before-hand that the end and purpose of the desire is evil ; for thereby he sheweth Reason why it ought not to be granted. *Example*, The *Romans* required of
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the Senate that *Appius* and the rest of the *Decemviri* should be delivered into their Hands, being determined to burn them all alive.

The first part of their Request seemed reasonable, but the end thereof unreasonable.

A course very dangerous it is in all States, by continual accusing and punishing, to hold the Subject in doubt and daily fear: For he that stands always looking for some trouble, becometh careless and apt to attempt Innovation. *Example*, The *Decemviri* being oppressed, the Tribunes authorized in their place, endeavoured daily to call in question the most part of the *Decemviri*, and many other Citizens also, whereof great Inconveniences arose, and much danger would have ensued, had not a Decree propounded by *M. Duillius* been made, that for one year no *Roman* Citizen should be accused.

Strange it is to see how Men in seeking their own security, lay the Injuries which they fear, upon other Men; as though it were necessary, either to offend or to be offended. *Example*, The *Ro-*

mans among themselves, united and strong, always endeavoured to offend the Nobles; and the Nobles likewise being persuaded they were strong, laboured to oppress the People: Which Humours were the cause of continual Troubles.

To make estimation and choice of Men fit to govern, the best course is to consider in particular; otherwise it might be imagined, that among the Multitude or meaner People, they being the greatest number, might be found some Persons of more perfection. *Example,* The People of *Rome* desiring that the Consulship might be given among them as Men of most Merit, did by all means endeavour to obtain that Honour; but being come to Election, and every Mans Vertue particularly considered, there could not be among the Multitude only one found fit for so great a place; and therefore the People themselves consented, that the Dignity should still remain as it was.

To persuade a Multitude to any Enterprise, is easie, if that which is persuaded, doth promise either Profit or Honour;

nour; yet oft under that external appearance lies hid loss or disadvantage. *Example,* The *Romans* persuading themselves that the slow Proceedings of *Fabius Maximus* in the War, was both chargeable and cowardly, required, That the General of the Horse might direct the War; which course had ruined *Rome*, if the Wisdom of *Fabius* had not been. Likewise, when *Hannibal* had divers years reigned in *Italy*, one *M. Centenius Penula*, a Man of base Birth, yet a Soldier of some Repute, undertook that if he with such Volunteers as would follow him, might have Authority to Fight, he would within few days deliver *Hannibal* either alive or dead: Which Offer was by the Senate accounted rash, yet for fear to offend the People, granted; and *Penula* with his Soldiers was cut in pieces.

To appease a Mutiny or Tumult in any Camp or City, there is no means more speedy or successful, than if some Person of great Quality and Respect, present himself to the People, and by his Wisdom lay before them the damage of their Discords, persuading them to Peace
and

and Patience. *Example*, The Faction of the *Frateschi* and *Arrasiani* in *Florence*; the one ready to assault the other. *Francisco Soderini*, Bishop of *Voterra*, in his Episcopal Habit, went between the Parties and appeased them: Also Count *Egremont*, by the Authority of his Wisdom and Presence, suppress a great Mutiny in *Antwerp*, between the Martinists and Papists.

A People corrupted, do rarely or never observe any Order or Ordinance, unless by Force of some Prince's Power they be thereto enforced; but where the Multitude is Incorrupt and Religious, all things are done justly, and without Compulsion. *Example*, *Camillus* at the Victory against the *Urenti*, vowed that the tenth part of the Pillage should be offered to *Apollo*; but the Senate supposing that the People would not consent to so great a Contribution, studied to dispense with that Vow, and to please *Apollo* and the People also by some other Means: Whereat the People shewed themselves openly offended, and willingly gave no less than the Sum formerly decreed. When the Free-Cities of *Germany* are occasioned to
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make Money for any Publick Service, the Magistrates impose one or two in the hundred on every City, which done, every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own Conscience he is able; and he with his own Hand, no other Witness being present, casteth the Money into a Coffer prepared for the purpose; which he would not, if his own Conscience did not enforce him.

When any extraordinary occasion happens to a City or Province, some prodigious Voice is heard, or some marvelous Sights are seen. Before *T. Gracchus* General of the *Roman* Army was betrayed by *Flavius Lucanus*, the *Aruspices* discovered two Serpents eating the Entrails of the Beasts sacrificed; which done, they vanish'd: Which Vision, as they divined, prognosticated the General's Death: Likewise *F. Savonarola* foretold the coming of King *Charles VIII.* into *Italy*: And *M. Sedigitus*, when the *Gauls* first came towards *Rome*, informed the Senate he heard a Voice much louder than any Man's, crying aloud, *Galli veniunt.*

The multitude of base People is naturally audacious and apt to Innovation; yet

yet unless they be directed by some Persons of Reputation and Wisdom, rarely do they joyn in any Action of great import. *Example*, The *Romans*, when their City was taken and sack'd by the *Gaals*, went to *Veio* with determination to dwell there: The Senate informed thereof, commanded, That upon great Pain every Citizen should return to *Rome*, whereat the People at first mocked; but when every Man particularly within himself considered his own Peril, all in general determined to obey the Magistrates.

In the Employment of Men for Service, neither Age nor Fortune ought so much to be regarded as Vertue; for young Men having made trial of their Valour, soon become aged, and thereby either unapt or unable to serve: Therefore well governed Commonwealths, preferred Military Vertue before any other respect. *Example*, *Valerius Corvinus*, with others, made Consul the three and twentieth Year of his Age, and *Pompey* triumphed in his Youth.

No wise or well-advised Prince or other State will undertake without excessive

cessive Forces to invade the Dominions of any other Prince, unless he assure himself of some Friends there to be a Mean, and as it were a Gate to prepare his Passage. *Example*, The Romans by Aid of the *Saguntines* entred *Spain*, the *Aetoli* called them into *Greece*, the *Hedias* into *France*: Likewise the *Palaologi* incited the *Turk* to come into *Thrace*; and *Ludovicus Sforza* occasioned *Charles* the French King to come into *Italy*.

A Republick desirous to extend the Bounds thereof, must endeavour to be fully furnish'd with Inhabitants, which may be done both by Love and Force: Love is gained by suffering Strangers to inhabit the City securely; and Force compels People to come thither, when other Cities and Towns near at hand be demolished or defaced: And impossible it is without this Order of proceeding, to enlarge any City or make the same of greater Power. *Example*, The Romans to enlarge their City demolished *Alba*, and many other Towns, and therewith also entertained all Strangers courteously: So as *Rome* grew to such greatness, that the City only could arm six hundred and forty

forty thousand Men ; but *Sparta* or *Athens* could never exceed twenty thousand, for that *Lycurgus* had inhibited the access of Strangers.

A Commonwealth that consumes more Treasure in the War, than it profits in Victory, seems to have rather hindred than honoured or enriched the State. A wise Captain therefore in his Actions, ought as well to profit the Republick, as to gain to himself Glory. *Example*, The Consuls of *Rome* did seldom desire Triumph, unless they returned from the War loaden with Gold, Silver and other rich Spoils fit to be delivered into the Common Treasury.

All Foreign Wars with Princes or other States taken in hand, be either for Ambition or Desire of Glory, or else for Necessity. *Example*, The *Romans* for their Ambition conquered many Nations, with intent only to have the Obedience of the People ; yet did they suffer them to hold Possession of their Houses, and sometimes they were permitted to live only with their old Laws. Likewise *Alexander* the Great endeavoured to suppress many Princes for his Glory, but did

did not dispossess the People, nor kill them.

Otherwise it is where a whole Nation inforced by Famine or Fury of War, abandon their own Dwellings, and are forced to inhabit elsewhere. *Example,* The *Goths* and other People of the North invaded the *Roman* Empire, and many other Provinces, whereof their Alteration of Names did ensue; as *Illyria*, now called *Slavonia*, *England* formerly named *Britain*.

A common Conceit and Saying it is, That Mony makes the War strong, and is the Force and Sinews thereof; as though he who hath most Treasure, be also most mighty; but Experience hath apparently shewed the contrary. *Example,* After the Death of *Alexander* King of *Macedon*, a multitude of *Gauls* went into *Greece*, and being there arrived, sent certain Ambassadors to the King, who supposing to make them afraid of his Power, shewed them his Treasure, which wrought a contrary effect; for the *Gauls*, before desirous of Peace, resolved then to continue the War, in hope to win that mighty mass of Mony. Likewise *Darius* should have

have vanquished *Alexander*, and the *Greeks* might have conquered the *Romans*, if the richer Prince might ever by his Money have prevailed.

Every League made with a Prince or Republick remote, is weak and rather aideth us with Fame than Effect, and consequently deceiveth all those that in such amity repose Confidence. *Example*, The *Florentines* being assaulted by the King of *Naples* and the Pope, prayed Aid of the French King; who being far distant, could not in Time Succour them: And the *Cedicini* desiring Aid of the *Capuani* against the *Samnites*, a People of no Force, were deceived.

A Prince whose People is well arm'd and train'd, shall do better to attend his Enemy at Home, than by Invasion to assault his Country: But such Princes whose Subjects are disarmed, had need to hold the Enemy aloof. *Example*, The *Romans*, and in this Age the *Swisses*, being well armed, may attend the War at Home; but the *Carthaginians* and *Italians* being not so well furnished, did ever use to seek the Enemy.

The Plurality of Commanders in equal Authority, is for the most part occasion of slow Proceeding in the War. *Example,* There was at one Time in *Rome* created four *Tribuni Militares* with Authority of Consuls, viz. *T. Quintus* after his Consulship, *Cajus Furius*, *M. Posthumus*, and *A. Cornelius Cassius*, amongst whom arose so much Diversity and Contrariety of Opinion, as nothing could be done till their Authority ceased, and *M. Emilius* made Dictator.

A Victory obtained by any great Captain with the Authority of his Prince's Commission, Council, and Directions, ought ever to be imputed rather to the Wisdom of the Prince, than the Valour of the Captain: Which made the Emperors of *Rome* to permit no Captains (how great soever his Victories were) to Triumph, as before that time the Consuls had done; and even in those Days a modest Refusal of Triumph was commended. *Example,* *M. Fulvius* having gained a great Victory against the *Tuscans*, was both by the Consent of the Senate and People of *Rome*, admitted to Triumph; but the Refe-

fal of that Honour proved his great Glory.

All they that from private Estate have aspired to Principality, either by Force or Fraud be come thereunto, unless the same be given, or by Inheritance descended: Yet it is rarely seen, that Force alone prevaileth, but Fraud without Force oft-times sufficeth. Example, *Agathocles* by such means became Prince of *Syracusa*; *John Galeazzo* by abusing his Uncle *Barnabus*, gained the Dominion of *Lombardy*; and *Cyrus* circumvented *Cyaxares* his Mothers Brother, and by that Craft aspired to Greatness.

Sudden Resolutions are always dangerous; and no less Peril ensueth of slow and doubtful Delays. Example, When *Hieron* Prince of *Syracuse* died, the War even then being in great Heat between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, they of *Syracusa* consulted, whether it were better to follow the Fortune of *Rome* or *Carthage*. In which Doubt they continued until *Apollonides*, a chief Captain of *Syracusa*, laid before them, That so long Delay would make them hated both of *Romans* and *Carthaginians*. Likewise the
Florentines

Florentines being by *Lewis* the Twelfth required to give his Army Passage towards *Naples*, mused so long upon an Answer, that he became their Enemy, and they forced to recover his Favour full dearly.

To govern a State is nothing else but to take such Order as the Subjects may not, or ought not to offend ; which may be done, either by removing from them all means to disobey, or by affording them so great Favours, as reasonably they ought not to change their Fortune ; for the mean Course proveth Dangerous. *Example*, The *Latins* being by the Valour of *Camillus* overcome, yielded themselves to endure what Punishment it pleased the *Romans* to inflict.

An Ingenious and Magnanimous Answer being made unto Wise Magistrates, doth oft obtain both Pardon and Grace. *Example*, When the *Privernates* had rebelled, and were by Force constrained to return to the Obedience of the *Romans*, they sent certain of the City unto *Rome*, to desire pardon ; who being brought before the Senate, one of the Senators asked the *Privernates*, what punishment them-

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selves did think they had deserved : The same, quoth they, which Men living in Freedom, think they are worthy of. Whereto the Consul thus replied, *Quid si pœnam remittimus ? Qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus ?* The Privernates answered, *Si bonam dederitis, & fidèlem & perpetuam : Si malam, haud diuturnam.* Which Answer was thought to proceed from generous Men, and therefore they were not only pardoned, but also honoured and received into the number of the *Roman* Citizens.

All Castles, Fortresses, and Places of Strength, be made for Defence, either against the Enemy or Subject : In the first Case they are not necessary, in the second dangerous. For thereby the Prince may at his Pleasure take occasion to insult upon the Subject, when much more seemly he might settle his Estate upon the Love and good Affection of Men. *Example,* The Castle of *Millan* made by Duke *Francisco Sforza*, incited his Heirs to become insolent ; and consequently they became odious ; which was also the cause that so soon as that City was assaulted, the Enemy with facility did possess it.

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That Prince or Potentate which builds his Severity rather upon the Trust he hath in Fortresses, than the Love of Men, shall be deceived: For no Place is so strong, as can long defend it self, unless by the Love and Aid of Men it be in time of Necessity succoured. *Example*, Pope *Julio* having drawn the *Bentivoli* out of *Bologna*, built there a strong Castle; the Governor thereof robbed the People, and they therewith grieved, in a short Time took the Castle from him. So after the Revolt of *Genoa*, *Lewis* the Twelfth came to the Recovery thereof, and builded there the strongest Fortification of *Italy*, as well for Sight as the Circumstances inexpugnable. Nevertheless the Citizens rebelled, and within sixteen Months the *French* were forced to yield the Castle and Government to *Ottavio Frangosa*.

To build Forts upon Places of Strength, either for defence of our own, or to hold that which is taken from others, hath ever proved to small purpose. *Example*, The *Romans* having suppressd the Rebellion of the *Latins* and *Privernates*, albeit they were People Warlike, and lovers

of Liberty ; yet to keep them Subject, built there no Castle, nor other Places fortified : And the *Lacedemonians* did not only forbear to fortifie the Towns they conquered, but also left their chief City of *Sparta* unwall'd.

The Necessity or Use of Fortification is only upon Frontiers, or such principal places where Princes make their Habitation; to the end the Fury of sudden Assaults may be staid, and Time for Succor entertained : Otherwise, *Example*, the Castle of *Millan* being made to hold the State in Obedience, could not so do either for the House of *Sforza* or *France*. *Guido Ubaldo*, Duke of *Velin*, driven from his Dominion by *Cesar Borgia*, so soon as he recovered his Country, caus'd all the Forts to be demolished : For by Experience he found the Love of Men was the surest Defence, and that Fortifications prevail'd no less against him than for him.

The Causes of Division and Faction in every Commonweal proceed most commonly of Idleness and Peace, and that which uniteth, is Fear and War. *Example*, The *V-jenti* and *Elinfci* having Intelligence

gence of great Contention between the Nobility and People of *Rome*, thought that a fit Opportunity to oppress the one and the other: But the *Romans* informed of such an Intention, appeased all Domestick Anger, and by the Valour of their Arms, conducted by *Gn. Manlius* and *M. Fabius*, defeated the Enemies Forces.

The means to usurp an Estate disjointed is, first before Arms be taken, to become, as it were, an Arbitrator or a Friend indifferent; and after Arms be taken, then to send moderate Aid to the weak Side, as well to entertain the War between the Factions, as also to consume the Strength both of the one, and the other; yet in no wise to employ any great Forces, for thereby either party may discover the Intents to suppress them. *Example*, The City of *Pistoia* fallen into Division, the *Florentines* took occasion sometimes to favor the one, and sometimes the other, that in the end both sides weary of the War, voluntarily yielded to their Devotion. *Philippo Viscount*, hoping sundry times by occasion of Faction to oppress the *Florentines*, did often

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assault

assault them with great Forces, which was the Cause that they became reunited; and consequently the Duke deceived of his Expectation.

A great Wildom it is to refrain Opprobrious and Injurious Speech: For as neither the one nor the other can any whit decrease the Enemies Force, so doth it move him to greater Hate, and more desire to offend. Example, *Gabides*, a General of the *Persians* having long besieged *Amida*, became weary, and preparing to abandon the enterprize, raised his Camp, which they of the City beholding, began to revile the *Persians*, and from the Walls reprov'd them of Cowardise; which indiscreet Words so highly offended *Gabides*, as thereupon he resolv'd to continue the Siege, and within few days won the City. *Tiberius Gracchus* appointed Captain of certain Bands of Men, whom for want of other Soldiers the *Romans* entertained, proclaimed in his Camp, That no Man, upon Pain of Death, should contumeliously call any Soldier Slave, either in Earnest or Jest. *Nam facite asperæ quando minimum ex vero trahere, acrem suum iam relinquunt.* Likewise

wife *Alexander* the Great having conquered well near all the East, brought his Forces before *Tyre*, they fearing *Alexander's* Fury, offered upon honourable Considerations to yeild him Obedience, only requiring, that neither he nor any of his Forces should enter the City, which motion after four Months *Alexander* accepted, and so signified by his Ambassador, who arriving at *Tyre* was by the proud Citizens slain, whereat *Alexander* grew into Choler, and being ready to forsake the Siege, staid his Forces, and in the end sacked the City and put the People to the Sword.

A Prince or any other State being assaulted by an Enemy of far more puissance than himself, ought not to refuse any honourable Compositions, chiefly when they are offered; for no Conditions can be so base, but shall in some sort turn to Advantage and Honour of him that accepts them. Example, *Anno* 1512. certain *Florentines* procured great Forces of *Spaniards* to come thither, as well to repofess the *Medici* then banish'd, as also to sack the City; promising that so soon as the Army of *Spain* did come

into the *Florentine* Dominion, the Faction of *Medici* would be ready armed to receive them. But the *Spaniards* being come, found no Forces at all to joyn with them ; and therefore wanting Visual, offered Composition. The *Florentines* finding the Enemy distressed grew insolent and refused Peace, whereof followed the loss of *Prato*, and many other Inconveniencies. The like happened to them of *Tyre*, as before.

The denial or delay of Justice desired in revenge of Injuries either publick or privately offered, is a thing very dangerous to every Prince or other State ; for that the Party injured doth oft by indirect means, though with hazard of his Country and himself, seek satisfaction : *Example*, The Complaint which the *Galli* made against the *Fabii* who sent Ambassadors in favour of the *Tossani*, not being heard, nor any punishment inflicted upon them for Fighting against the Law of Nations, was the cause that the *Galli* were offended with the States, whereof followed the sack of *Rome* ; and the delay of Justice in *Philip* of *Macedon*, for not revenging the incestuous oppression of

of *Attalus* to *Pausanias*, was the Motive to murder that King.

Whoso endeavours the alteration of any State must of necessity proceed with all severity, and leave some memorable Example to those that shall impugn the Ordinance of Government newly settled. *Example*, When *Junius Brutus* had by his great Valour banish'd the *Tarquins*, and sworn the People that no King should ever reign in *Rome*; with in short time after, many young Nobles, among whom was *Brutus's* Son, impatient of the equality of the new Government, conspired to recall the *Tarquins*; but *Brutus* thereof informed, caused his own Son not only to be condemned to death, but was himself present at the Execution.

As Health and soundness of the Hands, Legs, and other outward Members cannot continue Life, unless the Heart and vital Spirits within be strong and firm; so Fortifications and Frontier-defences do not prevail, unless the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well armed: *Example*, When the Emperor came into *Italy*, and had with some difficulty

past

pass the confines of the *Venetians* well near without resistance ; his Army march'd to *Venice*, and might doubtless have possess'd the City, had it not been defended with Water. Likewise the *English* in their assault of *France*, excepting a few Encounters on the Frontiers, found no puissant resistance within the Realm. And *Anno* 1513. they forced all that State, and the King himself to tremble, as oft before they had done ; but contrariwise the *Romans* knowing that Life lay in the Heart, ever held the Body of their State strongest : For the nearer the Enemy approach'd *Rome*, the better they found the Country armed and defended.

The desire to command sovereignly is of so great Force, as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of Principality, but also in them that have no Title at all. *Example*, this Appetite moved the Wife of *Tarquinius Priscus* contrary to all natural Duty to incite her Husband to murder her own Father *Servilius*, and possess his Kingdom, as being persuaded it were much more honourable to be a Queen than to be the Daughter of a King.

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The violation of ancient Laws, Orders and Customs, under which People have long time lived, is the chief and only Cause whereby Princes hazard their Estate and Royal Dignity. *Example*, Albeit the deflowring of *Lucrece* was the occasion, yet was it not the cause that moved the *Romans* to take Arms against *Tarquin*; for he having before that fact or *Sextus* his Son, governed Tyrannically, and taken from the Senate all Authority, was become odious both to the Senate, Nobility and People, who finding themselves well-governed, never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration.

A Prince that desires to live secure from Conspiracy, hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over-great Riches and Honors, than those whom he hath greatly injured; because they want Means to offend; the other have many opportunities to do it: *Example*, *Perrenius* the prime Favorite of *Commodus* the Emperor, conspired his Death. *Plantianus* did the like to *Severus*, and *Sejanus* to *Tiberius*; for being advanced to so great Honors, Riches and
Offices,

Offices, as nothing remained desirable but the Imperial Title, they conspired against the Persons of their Sovereigns in hope of the Dignity ; but in the end they endured that Punishment which to such Disloyalty and Ingratitude appertaineth.

An Army which wants Experience, albeit the Captain be expert, is not greatly to be feared ; neither ought an Army of well-train'd Soldiers to be much esteemed, whose Captain is ignorant. Example, *Cesar* going into *Africa* against *Afranius* and *Petrus* whose Army was full of old Soldiers, said he feared them little, *Quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce*. Contrariwise, when he went to *Pharsalia* to encounter *Pompey*, he said, *Ibo ad ducem sine exercitu*.

A Captain-General commanding an Army ought rather to govern with Curtesie and Mildness, than with over-much Austerity and Severity. Example, *L.* and *Appius Claudius* being Consuls, were appointed to govern the War. To *L.* was allotted one Army which served very dutifully ; but *Appius* commanding the other with great Cruelty, was by his
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Soldiers unwillingly obeyed. Nevertheless *Tacitus* seems of contrary Opinion, saying, *Plus Pœna quam obsequium valet.*

Therefore to reconcile these different Conceits, I say, that a General having power to command Men, either they are Confederates or Subjects: If Confederates or Voluntaries, he may not proceed to extream punishment; if Subjects, and his power absolute, they may be governed otherwise; yet with such respect, as the insolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him.

Honour may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of Victory. Every Man knoweth Glory is due to the Victor, and we deny not the same Priviledge to the vanquished, being able to make proof that the Loss proceeded not from his Default. Neither is it dishonourable to violate those Promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of War inforceth. And forced Promises which concern a whole State, are not binding, and rarely or ever kept, nor is the Breaker thereby to receive Disgrace. Example,

ple, *Posthumus* the Consul having made a dishonourable Peace with the *Samnites*, was by them with his whole Army sent home disarmed. Being arrived at *Rome*, the Consul informed the People they were not bound to perform the base Conditions he was compelled to yield unto; albeit, he and those few that promised, were bound to perform them. The Senate thereupon concluded to send him Prisoner to *Samno*, where he constantly protested the Fault to be only his own; wherefore the People by that Peace incurred no Dishonour at all: And Fortune so much favoured *Posthumus*, as the *Samnites* were content presently to return him to *Rome*; where he became more glorious for losing the Victory, than was *Pontius* at *Samno* for having won the Victory.

Wise Men have long observed, That who so will know what shall be, must consider what is past; for all worldly Things hold the same course they had at first. The Reason is, that as long as Men are possess'd with the same Passions with former Ages, consequently of these doings the same effects ensue. *Example,*

ample, The *Almains* and *French* have ever been noted for their Avarice, Pride, Fury and Infidelity, and so in divers Ages, experience hath proved even to this present: For perfidious Dealing the *French* have given sufficient proof, not only in ancient times, but also in the time of *Charles VIII.* who promised to render to the *Florentines* the Ports of *Pisa*, but having divers times received Mony, held them notwithstanding in possession. The *Florentines* found the like in the *Almains*; for in the Wars of the *Visconti*, Dukes of *Milan*, they prayed aid of the Emperor, who promised them great Forces; in consideration whereof, he was to receive of the *Florentines* one hundred thousand Crowns in Hand, and as much more when his Army was arrived in *Italy*, both which Payments were performed; but as soon as the Emperor came to *Verona* he devised Cavillations of Unkindness whereupon he returned home.

A Prince desirous to obtain any thing of another, must if occasion so permit, urge his Demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present Answer, as he

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who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial. *Example*, Pope *Julio* endeavoured to drive out of *Bologna* all the *Bentivoli*, in which Action he thought the aid of the *French* necessary, and that the *Venetians* should stand neutral; and by divers Messengers did sollicite them to that Effect; but not receiving any resolute Answer, he thought fit with those few Forces he had to take his Journey to *Bologna*, whereon the *Venetians* advertised him they would remain neutral, and the *French* King forthwith sent him Forces, as fearing the Popes Indignation; likewise the *Tuscans* having formerly desired aid of the *Samnites* against the *Romans*, took Arms suddenly and obtained their request which the *Samnites* had before denied.

When a Multitude offendeth, all may not be punish'd, because they are too many: To punish part and leave the rest unpunish'd, were Injury to the Sufferers; and to those that escape, an Encouragement to offend again; therefore to eschew all extremity, mean Courses have been anciently used. *Example*,
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When all the Wives of the *Romans* conspired to Poyson their Husbands, a convenient number of them were punisht, and the rest suffered to pass: Likewise at the conspiracy of the *Bacchanals* in the time of the *Macedonian* War, wherein many thousands Men and Women had part, every tenth person only was put to death by lot, although the offence were general; by which manner of punishing, he that suffered, complain'd on his fortune; and he that escap'd, was put in fear, that offending again, the same punishment might light upon himself, and therefore would no more offend.

A Battel or great action in Arms ought not to be enterpris'd without special Commission or Command from the Prince; otherwise the General incurs great danger. Example, *Papirius* the Dictator punisht the General of the Horse in the *Roman* Army, for having fought without his consent, although he had in battle slain 20000 Enemies without loss of 200 of his own; and *Cesar* commended his Captain *Sextus* for having refrain'd to fight,

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though with great advantage he might. Also count *Egmont* hazarded the favor of the King his Master for giving bat-tel to Marshall *de Thermes*, albeit he were victorious: for upon the success of that action the loss or safety of all the Low Countries depended.

To govern without Council is not only dangerous in *Aristocracies* and Popular States, but unto independent Princes an occasion of utter ruin. Example, *Hieron* the first King of *Sicily* in all his proceedings used the advice of Counsels, and lived fifty years prosperously in Peace; but his grand-child succeeding, refusing all Counsel lost his Kingdom, and was with all his Kinsfolk and Friends cruelly slain.

In all Monarchies the Senate or privy-Council is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity, or Men of approved wisdom and understanding. Example, In *Polonia* no Man is Counsellor unless he be a *Palatine*, a *Bishop*, a *Castellan*, a *Captain*, or such a one as hath been Ambassador: and in *Turky* the title of Counsellor is not given but only to the four *Bassas*. The two *Cadet-squires*,

deſquires, the twelve *Beglerbegs*, and Kings Son, who in his Fathers abſence, is as it were a Preſident of the *Diva-no* or *Senate*.

Many Princes Ancient and Modern have uſed to ſelect out of their Council, two or three, or four at moſt, to whom only they did impart their affairs. *Example*, The Emperor *Auguſtus* had *Mecenas* and *Agrippa*; *Julius Ceſar*, *Q. Pædus* and *Cor. Balbus*, whom he only truſted with his Cipher and ſecrets, being Counſellors of the Cabinet (as we now call them.)

The alteration of old Laws, or introduction of new, are in all States very dangerous, notwithſtanding any appearance of profit or publick utility, which moved wiſe Governours to decree, that ancient Laws once eſtabliſhed might never be called in queſtion. *Example*, The *Athenians* decreed that no Law ſhould be propounded to the People without the conſent of the Senate : the like uſe is obſerved in *Venice*, where no Petition is preferred to the Senate but by advice of the Sages ; and among the *Lovians* the Cuſtom

was, that whosoever presented any new Law to be confirmed, should come with a Halter about his Neck, and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected; also *Lycurgus* to prevent the alteration of his Laws, did swear the People of *Sparta* to observe them until his return, and thereupon retired himself into voluntary exile, with intent never to return.

When necessity or good reason moves Innovation or Abolition of Laws, a course more secure it is to do it rather by degrees than suddenly. *Example*, The *Romans* finding the Laws of the twelve Tables unprofitable, suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion, but would not publickly suppress them for fear of calling other Laws into contempt: so did they continue 700 years, and were then called by *Ebutius* the *Tribune*. But *Agis* King of *Lacedemon* desirous to revive the Laws of *Lycurgus*, long discontinued, enforced all Men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled, to the end a new partition of Lands and Goods might be made; which suddain
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and violent proceeding proved so fatal, that it moved a dangerous sedition, wherein he was disposed and with his Mother and Friends put to death; which *Example* haply moved the *Venitians* not to attempt any thing against the Authority of *Augustino Barberino* their Duke: but after his death, and before the Election of *Loredano*, the *Signory* published new Ordinances detractions from the *Ducal* Authority.

Whoso hath won to himself so great Love and Affection, as thereby to become master of the forces, and at his pleasure commands the Subjects apt for Arms, may also without right or title assure himself of the whole Estate. Example, *Hugh Capet* a Subject to the Crown of *France*, being greatly honoured by the Soldiers, found means thereby to prevent *Charles Duke of Lorrain* of the Crown, being right Heir by descent from *Charlemain*. And albeit the Families of the *Paleologi*, *Ebrami* and *Turcan*, be of the blood Royal and Right Heirs to the *Turkish* Empire, when the *Ottoman* Line shall fail; yet it is like that the chief *Bassa* having the love of the *Janissaries*

ries will usurp the State, because the *Pa-
leologi* and other Competitors be far from
the *Turks* person, poor and without
means to purchase the Soldiers favor.

A Commander General in Arms,
ought upon pain of great punishment
be enjoyned, not to imploy or retain
any forces longer than the time of his
Commission. *Example*, The *Dictators*
of *Rome* were in this point so precise,
as never any of them dared to trans-
gress the time prefixed, till *Cesar* ob-
tained that dignity should continue in
him for life; which was the cause of
his usurpation of the State. Also the
Thebans commanded, that if the Gene-
ral of their Army did hold his forces
one day longer than the time prefixt,
he should thereby incur danger of death:
which Justice was executed upon *Epa-
minondas* and *Pelopidas*.

Banishment of great Lords, or Citi-
zens of great Reputation, hath been in
divers places diversly used: for in the
one, they were inforced only to absent
themselves without further infliction;
in the other, Banishment was accom-
panied with Confiscation, a course of
great

great danger. *Example*, In *Argos*, *Athens*, *Ephesus*, and other Cities of *Greece*, the Citizens puissant in Friends, Vertue or Riches, were many times banish'd for Envy or Fear, but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer than ten Years; and that without loss of Goods, which was the cause that never any of them Warred against the Country: But *Dion* being banish'd *Syracusa* by *Dionysius Junior*, and *Coriolanus* from *Rome*, did make mighty Wars against their own Country. The like was done by the *Medici* in *Florence*.

Honourable and Magnanimous Men were wont not only to enterprize great Acts, but also to suffer patiently all Injuries which Foes or Fortune could expose them to: As resolved, that no Calamity was so great as to make their Minds abject, or to forget the Dignity appertaining to Persons vertuous: *Example*, After the defeat of the *Roman* Army upon the River *Allia*, the *Galls* persued the Victory even to *Rome's* Walls: Whither being come, and finding the Gates open, without any sign of Resistance they entred the Streets, where

all Honourable Palaces were also unshut, which caused the *Galli* greatly to doubt. Nevertheless looking into the Houses, they found in every of them a Senator set in a Chair of State, and in his Hand a Rod of Ivory; his Person was also vested with Robes of Dignity, which Majestick Spectacle did marvelously amaze the *Galli*, not having before that time seen any such Reverend Sight; and therefore did not only refrain to offer Violence, but highly admired the *Roman* Courage, chiefly in that Fortune. Nevertheless at length a rude *Gall* hapned with his Hand to touch the white Beard of *M. Papyrius*, whereat he taking great disdain struck him with his Rod, in requital whereof the Barbarian slew *Papyrius*, and by that example all the other Senators and persons of dignity were also slain.

Albeit the knowledge and study of Letters be both commendable and necessary in all well regulated States; yet if under so honest pretence, Idleness enter, such Abuses most seasonably be foreseen and removed. *Example*, When *Diogenes* and *Cynander*, two excellent Philosophers, were

were sent Ambassadors from *Athens* to the *Romans*, many of the Nobility that before disposed themselves to Arms, allured with their Eloquence and marvellous Wisdom, began with great Admiration to follow them: And in lieu of Arms, turned their endeavours to the study of Letters, which the wise *Cato* discerning, procured the Senate to decree that (to eschew all Inconveniences which so honest Idleness might breed) no Philosophers should from thenceforth be received into *Rome*.

The Honour due to Magistrates was anciently much regarded, and contrariwise all irreverent and undutiful Behaviour with great Severity punish'd. Example, The Censors of *Rome* degraded a Citizen only for having yawned loud in their Presence: And another called *Vestius* was slain in the Field, for not doing due reverence to a Tribune when he pass'd by him. It is also observed, that the Son of *Fab. Maximus* when he was *Censor*, meeting his Father on Horseback, and seeing the Serjeants afraid to speak to him to dismount, did himself Command him so to do, which Com-
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mand the Father cheerfully and willingly obeyed, saying, Domestick Power must give place to Publick Authority.

Tyrannous Princes having incurred the universal Hate of People, found no means so meet to preserve them from Popular Fury, as to execute or deliver into their Hands their own chief Minions and intimate Counsellors. Example, *Tiberius* delivered to the People his Favourite *Seianus*; *Nero*, *Tigellinus*. *Henry* King of *Swede* committed to their Fury his best beloved Servant *George Preſton*; *Caracalla* caused all his Flatterers to be slain that had persuaded him to kill his Brother. The like was done by *Caligula*, whereby he escaped himself.

A Prince that rewards or pardons a Person that kills another Prince, albeit by that means he is aspired to Sovereignty, shall thereby both incur great Danger and Hate, and encourage Men therein to attempt the like against himself. Therefore wise Princes have not only left such Services quite unrecompenced, but also most severely punished them.

them. *Example*, The Emperor *Severus* put all those to death that consented to the Murder of *Pertinax* ; and *Alexander* the Great executed him that slew *Darius*, as abhorring that Subject that would lay violent Hands on his Prince, notwithstanding he were an Enemy. Likewise *Vitellius* put to death all the Murderers and Conspirators against *Galba* ; and *Domitian* Executed his Secretary *Epa-phroditus* for the Murder of *Nero*, although he instantly desired his aid.

The vertuous and vitious Examples of Princes incite Subjects to imitate the same Qualities ; which Rule never or very rarely fails. *Example*, *Francis* the First King of *France*, and other Princes in divers Ages and Places, had great esteem of Learned Men ; and forthwith all the Princes, Nobles, Nobility and Clergy, disposed themselves so earnestly to study, as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of Learned Men, as well in Tongues as Sciences. Contrariwise, *Alexander* the Great, otherwise a Prince of great Vertue, by his immoderate use of Drinking, did draw the greatest number of his Court

Court and People also to delight in Drunkenness. The like effect followed the excessive Intemperance of *Mithridates*, King of *Amasia*.

The last and not the least considerable, is, to observe how great effects Devotion and Contempt of Human Glory worketh in the Minds not only of private Persons, but of Kings and Princes also, who have oft abandoned worldly Profit, Honour and Pleasure, to embrace the contemplative retired Life. Example, *Ramirus* King of *Aragon*, *Verecundus* King of *Spain*, *Charlemain* Son of *Carolus Martellus*, *Matilda* Queen of *France*, *Amurath* King of *Turbay*, with many others. *Imperio Maximus, exemplo Major.*

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